Dear Richard,
Elsewhere on this site I've posted my notes on the extraordinary (for all the wrong reasons) "stakeholder engagement" meeting you co-hosted with Sean Valoo on 18th September 2023. To remind readers, this was intended to be, the OPSS had said, an open discussion with stakeholders about the consultation proposals and a chance to have our questions answered. I and others thought, how on earth would they answer all these people's questions (around 80 names were on the copy list) in a 90 mins meeting?
For the record, this was the first full stakeholder meeting held by the government since a two-venue meeting in 2020 (London and Birmingham) which they blocked me from entering (which was why I was a little suspicious to have been invited to this one). And the previous full stakeholder meeting before that had been as far back as August 2015. So just three in 8 years on a subject of incredible importance for the health of the UK population.
As you know, Richard, this meeting was different in two ways. First, it was virtual only and second there was no way for any stakeholder to actually "engage" with it. We could not speak to you, and even the chat function was switched off. Instead we had you and Sean reading out the entire consultation document, which took an hour, despite the fact that everyone on the call had obviously already read it. Then you announced you were going to answer all our questions that we'd sent in for the meeting. Oh, but to help smooth the process, you had sorted the questions into themes; and it was these themes you would actually "answer". I'd put in some very detailed questions, as you'd no doubt expected, but oddly enough they didn't fit into any of your themes, so I didn't get any answers. I wasn't the only one.
I won't go into the details of this Q&A. Let's just say that nothing of any real meat was dealt with. There was one exception and the fact you Richard raised it suggested you really did need to deal with it: our old friend, smoke toxicity. I'm sure you were aware that at this time, the press was writing about high levels of cancers in firefighters, caused by smoke toxicity, and the FBU had just announced that it was going to tackle legislation that leads to flame retardants poisoning firefighters.
The following exchange has been transcribed from the audio recording of this meeting made by the OPSS: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jkZsL_v0vnk
OPSS official: ". . . another question - about why are we not addressing smoke toxicity through the New Approach?
Jude: Yes, that's a challenging one. The key is, and the starting place in the New Approach, is . . . much of the 1988 regulations is about preventing ignition rather than reflecting and assessing risk post-ignition. And that's the approach we've agreed with senior colleagues and senior stakeholders like fire chiefs; that's the reason we're going down that approach and if we were to completely re-write the rule book it would pose a very long challenge, I think.
Let's pause here. I've been a leading expert on these regulations for over ten years, having regular contact with everyone that has a stake in them. Never once have I heard it suggested that "much of the regulations is about preventing ignition rather than reflecting and assessing risk post-ignition". I'm calling you out on this, Richard. Why did you make this clearly false statement about a key subject in fire deaths? Who put you up to it or did you think of it yourself? The sentence that follows is also clearly false since "senior colleagues and senior stakeholders like fire chiefs" could not possibly agree with your premise. But if they have in fact since agreed, then you need to produce evidence that they have: names and statements. But that's not your way, is it? Your way is to lie about key issues, linked to false conflations, all designed to get you personally (and your Department) off the hook, and to hell with fire toxicity that in just about every home fire in the UK is majorly caused by furniture full of flame retardants. To continue:
Valoo: Yeah, and I think you know there's appetite amongst us all to deliver a New Approach as soon as possible and I think that taking on the challenge of regulating for smoke toxicity would have delayed us being able to put forward proposals for a New Approach somewhat.
The New Approach does not really exist, of course. And it's not new anyway. In the past, safety laws on the whole were prescriptive, like the furniture regs: they told you exactly what to do to be compliant. Then a different approach came in to EU (and therefore to the UK) safety legislation – also called New Approach - which was less prescriptive laws, like the General Product Safety Directive which pretty much just says that products must be "safe". It's up to the producer to discover what "safe" means, what standards should be applied and so on. Certain, shall we say, profit-minded fire safety big shots were also behind the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, governing the fire safety of non-domestic environments, including upholstered furniture. Again, in order to comply, the "responsible person" has to demonstrate that their premises and products are "safe". And, believe it or not, it's up to them to decide what that means. This replaced legislation that was much more prescriptive. The so-called new "New Approach" is trying to pull the same switcheroo with domestic furniture fire safety. To continue:
[Valoo] But, as Richard said, it is something we are considering and many of you raised [this] as an issue; and it's also something we're discussing with colleagues in [inaudible – Delup?]
I think Sean Valoo is referring here to the Department for Levelling Up and this report by them: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6440f2596dda69000d11e15e/Independent_Review_of_the_Construction_Product_Testing_Regime.pdf
[Valoo] who have begun a project looking into the smoke toxicity of construction products, and that is a project that fell out of the Grenfell Inquiry, and so we're liaising with them to understand how we can adopt, and do some of what they're doing in that space in terms of, well, products more generally but also in terms of product [inaudible] fire safety.
Jude: And I guess the toxicity risk, as well as [kind of listening to the outputs from Delup there?], um, the new framework that our colleagues in the product safety review team are considering – they're looking to kind of consider hazards [inaudible] across different products, so if there is evidence that supports general requirements across certain sectors in relation to smoke toxicity, I'd encourage stakeholders to respond to that consultation as well but that in terms of general requirements that can be put in place across right across the framework, but also in the way we regulate upholstered furniture.
You might here be referring to this consultation: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/consultation-on-the-new-safety-regime-for-occupied-higher-risk-buildings/consultation-on-the-new-safety-regime-for-occupied-higher-risk-buildings But if so, I'm not sure why since it closed quite some time back and the government responded in Oct 2023. You appear to be saying that smoke toxicity occurs in all sorts of products and Levelling Up is looking at that therefore contact them and not us. The fact that in a home fire, the vast majority of smoke toxicity including the production of hydrogen cyanide comes from burning furniture is something that according to you doesn't concern the OPSS anyway because your regulations are only responsible for pre-ignition issues.
The "engagement" meeting closed soon after this exchange, with you Richard saying, "I think that gives a very good flavour of the questions you've been asking and thank you very much for joining us this morning. I think this has been a very productive session, from our perspective [!] . . . we hope it was useful."
On the surface, the above exchange actually encapsulates all that's wrong with how the government is dealing with what remains a massive scandal regarding public health and the truth about the Grenfell Tower fire tragedy. As I'm sure you're well aware, Richard: at least I can't think of any other reason why you would try and tell the world your department has no responsibility for smoke toxicity in home fires.
I had to keep re-listening to the recording to try to even hear what you were actually saying. Is this confusion deliberate? Well, I don't think it's conscious, as your relaxed body language indicates. It's actually I think more the result of a semi-deliberate policy of spreading one's true intent around several apparently related (but not really) issues, institutions and ideas in order to prevent anyone focussing on the real problem and, more importantly, who's responsible for it. And using the term "Delup" without explaining that this is a slang term for another government department (assuming that it is), suggests you're trying to hide something. At the very least it's disrespectful to your stakeholders.
In summary, I do not believe your claim about smoke toxicity not being your responsibility was a casual statement. You are trying to say that the regs, and your department, are not responsible for smoke toxicity, at Grenfell or anywhere else, because that is all a "post-ignition" matter.
As said, your claims that this approach has been agreed with senior colleagues is of course unverified: you don't say who they are exactly; it could mean only OPSS senior colleagues. Nor do you say where the notes of these discussions can be found. You just say it's been agreed "[with] senior stakeholders like the fire chiefs".
During this consultation process and in the consultation document itself (page 21) OPSS has been leaning rather heavily on the NFCC to justify their decision to keep an open flame test in the regs; this for example from your consultation proposals:
The development of the proposed scope has been supported by research commissioned by the Office for Product Safety and Standards and carried out by research consortia consisting of UCLan, Birmingham University, Oakdene Hollins, and WhaleyResearch. The peer-reviewed Fire Risks of Upholstered Products research and subsequent discussions with the representatives of the London Fire Brigade and National Fire Chiefs Council have considered the extent of the fire safety risk posed by products while also reflecting their foreseeable use and the potential exposure of users to chemical flame retardants.
Note, however, that there is no mention here of any direct conversations between the NFCC and the OPSS. So when you Richard say you've "agreed with", you really mean that the OPSS commissioned some research which the NFCC was asked to contribute to (but not the FBU, nor the EAC, nor anyone in fact who might be opposed to the continuation of flame retardants in UK furniture).
Stakeholders have written asking for the names of the people in the NFCC claiming this and some evidence of the research to back it up. As usual when faced with awkward questions, however, the OPSS did not reply.
I won't continue for now. The purpose of this letter is to put questions to you, Richard, as a member of the OPSS team responsible for the furniture regulations. You almost certainly won't respond, mainly because we both know you can't, not without lying further at any rate. My experience with officials like you is you have the enviable ability to convince yourself that you're right, even when all evidence and facts say you're not. This is a very convenient ability to possess since it allows you to side-step any conscience you may still possess. The fact is, however, that you Richard are acting directly against the public good and are responsible, personally, for ensuring that every person, and in particular children and firefighters, in this country will continue to be poisoned in their own homes for many years to come. I hope whatever rewards and promotions you receive in the civil service are worth it.
Regards,
Terry Edge
Elsewhere on this site I've posted my notes on the extraordinary (for all the wrong reasons) "stakeholder engagement" meeting you co-hosted with Sean Valoo on 18th September 2023. To remind readers, this was intended to be, the OPSS had said, an open discussion with stakeholders about the consultation proposals and a chance to have our questions answered. I and others thought, how on earth would they answer all these people's questions (around 80 names were on the copy list) in a 90 mins meeting?
For the record, this was the first full stakeholder meeting held by the government since a two-venue meeting in 2020 (London and Birmingham) which they blocked me from entering (which was why I was a little suspicious to have been invited to this one). And the previous full stakeholder meeting before that had been as far back as August 2015. So just three in 8 years on a subject of incredible importance for the health of the UK population.
As you know, Richard, this meeting was different in two ways. First, it was virtual only and second there was no way for any stakeholder to actually "engage" with it. We could not speak to you, and even the chat function was switched off. Instead we had you and Sean reading out the entire consultation document, which took an hour, despite the fact that everyone on the call had obviously already read it. Then you announced you were going to answer all our questions that we'd sent in for the meeting. Oh, but to help smooth the process, you had sorted the questions into themes; and it was these themes you would actually "answer". I'd put in some very detailed questions, as you'd no doubt expected, but oddly enough they didn't fit into any of your themes, so I didn't get any answers. I wasn't the only one.
I won't go into the details of this Q&A. Let's just say that nothing of any real meat was dealt with. There was one exception and the fact you Richard raised it suggested you really did need to deal with it: our old friend, smoke toxicity. I'm sure you were aware that at this time, the press was writing about high levels of cancers in firefighters, caused by smoke toxicity, and the FBU had just announced that it was going to tackle legislation that leads to flame retardants poisoning firefighters.
The following exchange has been transcribed from the audio recording of this meeting made by the OPSS: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jkZsL_v0vnk
OPSS official: ". . . another question - about why are we not addressing smoke toxicity through the New Approach?
Jude: Yes, that's a challenging one. The key is, and the starting place in the New Approach, is . . . much of the 1988 regulations is about preventing ignition rather than reflecting and assessing risk post-ignition. And that's the approach we've agreed with senior colleagues and senior stakeholders like fire chiefs; that's the reason we're going down that approach and if we were to completely re-write the rule book it would pose a very long challenge, I think.
Let's pause here. I've been a leading expert on these regulations for over ten years, having regular contact with everyone that has a stake in them. Never once have I heard it suggested that "much of the regulations is about preventing ignition rather than reflecting and assessing risk post-ignition". I'm calling you out on this, Richard. Why did you make this clearly false statement about a key subject in fire deaths? Who put you up to it or did you think of it yourself? The sentence that follows is also clearly false since "senior colleagues and senior stakeholders like fire chiefs" could not possibly agree with your premise. But if they have in fact since agreed, then you need to produce evidence that they have: names and statements. But that's not your way, is it? Your way is to lie about key issues, linked to false conflations, all designed to get you personally (and your Department) off the hook, and to hell with fire toxicity that in just about every home fire in the UK is majorly caused by furniture full of flame retardants. To continue:
Valoo: Yeah, and I think you know there's appetite amongst us all to deliver a New Approach as soon as possible and I think that taking on the challenge of regulating for smoke toxicity would have delayed us being able to put forward proposals for a New Approach somewhat.
The New Approach does not really exist, of course. And it's not new anyway. In the past, safety laws on the whole were prescriptive, like the furniture regs: they told you exactly what to do to be compliant. Then a different approach came in to EU (and therefore to the UK) safety legislation – also called New Approach - which was less prescriptive laws, like the General Product Safety Directive which pretty much just says that products must be "safe". It's up to the producer to discover what "safe" means, what standards should be applied and so on. Certain, shall we say, profit-minded fire safety big shots were also behind the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, governing the fire safety of non-domestic environments, including upholstered furniture. Again, in order to comply, the "responsible person" has to demonstrate that their premises and products are "safe". And, believe it or not, it's up to them to decide what that means. This replaced legislation that was much more prescriptive. The so-called new "New Approach" is trying to pull the same switcheroo with domestic furniture fire safety. To continue:
[Valoo] But, as Richard said, it is something we are considering and many of you raised [this] as an issue; and it's also something we're discussing with colleagues in [inaudible – Delup?]
I think Sean Valoo is referring here to the Department for Levelling Up and this report by them: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6440f2596dda69000d11e15e/Independent_Review_of_the_Construction_Product_Testing_Regime.pdf
[Valoo] who have begun a project looking into the smoke toxicity of construction products, and that is a project that fell out of the Grenfell Inquiry, and so we're liaising with them to understand how we can adopt, and do some of what they're doing in that space in terms of, well, products more generally but also in terms of product [inaudible] fire safety.
Jude: And I guess the toxicity risk, as well as [kind of listening to the outputs from Delup there?], um, the new framework that our colleagues in the product safety review team are considering – they're looking to kind of consider hazards [inaudible] across different products, so if there is evidence that supports general requirements across certain sectors in relation to smoke toxicity, I'd encourage stakeholders to respond to that consultation as well but that in terms of general requirements that can be put in place across right across the framework, but also in the way we regulate upholstered furniture.
You might here be referring to this consultation: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/consultation-on-the-new-safety-regime-for-occupied-higher-risk-buildings/consultation-on-the-new-safety-regime-for-occupied-higher-risk-buildings But if so, I'm not sure why since it closed quite some time back and the government responded in Oct 2023. You appear to be saying that smoke toxicity occurs in all sorts of products and Levelling Up is looking at that therefore contact them and not us. The fact that in a home fire, the vast majority of smoke toxicity including the production of hydrogen cyanide comes from burning furniture is something that according to you doesn't concern the OPSS anyway because your regulations are only responsible for pre-ignition issues.
The "engagement" meeting closed soon after this exchange, with you Richard saying, "I think that gives a very good flavour of the questions you've been asking and thank you very much for joining us this morning. I think this has been a very productive session, from our perspective [!] . . . we hope it was useful."
On the surface, the above exchange actually encapsulates all that's wrong with how the government is dealing with what remains a massive scandal regarding public health and the truth about the Grenfell Tower fire tragedy. As I'm sure you're well aware, Richard: at least I can't think of any other reason why you would try and tell the world your department has no responsibility for smoke toxicity in home fires.
I had to keep re-listening to the recording to try to even hear what you were actually saying. Is this confusion deliberate? Well, I don't think it's conscious, as your relaxed body language indicates. It's actually I think more the result of a semi-deliberate policy of spreading one's true intent around several apparently related (but not really) issues, institutions and ideas in order to prevent anyone focussing on the real problem and, more importantly, who's responsible for it. And using the term "Delup" without explaining that this is a slang term for another government department (assuming that it is), suggests you're trying to hide something. At the very least it's disrespectful to your stakeholders.
In summary, I do not believe your claim about smoke toxicity not being your responsibility was a casual statement. You are trying to say that the regs, and your department, are not responsible for smoke toxicity, at Grenfell or anywhere else, because that is all a "post-ignition" matter.
As said, your claims that this approach has been agreed with senior colleagues is of course unverified: you don't say who they are exactly; it could mean only OPSS senior colleagues. Nor do you say where the notes of these discussions can be found. You just say it's been agreed "[with] senior stakeholders like the fire chiefs".
During this consultation process and in the consultation document itself (page 21) OPSS has been leaning rather heavily on the NFCC to justify their decision to keep an open flame test in the regs; this for example from your consultation proposals:
The development of the proposed scope has been supported by research commissioned by the Office for Product Safety and Standards and carried out by research consortia consisting of UCLan, Birmingham University, Oakdene Hollins, and WhaleyResearch. The peer-reviewed Fire Risks of Upholstered Products research and subsequent discussions with the representatives of the London Fire Brigade and National Fire Chiefs Council have considered the extent of the fire safety risk posed by products while also reflecting their foreseeable use and the potential exposure of users to chemical flame retardants.
Note, however, that there is no mention here of any direct conversations between the NFCC and the OPSS. So when you Richard say you've "agreed with", you really mean that the OPSS commissioned some research which the NFCC was asked to contribute to (but not the FBU, nor the EAC, nor anyone in fact who might be opposed to the continuation of flame retardants in UK furniture).
Stakeholders have written asking for the names of the people in the NFCC claiming this and some evidence of the research to back it up. As usual when faced with awkward questions, however, the OPSS did not reply.
I won't continue for now. The purpose of this letter is to put questions to you, Richard, as a member of the OPSS team responsible for the furniture regulations. You almost certainly won't respond, mainly because we both know you can't, not without lying further at any rate. My experience with officials like you is you have the enviable ability to convince yourself that you're right, even when all evidence and facts say you're not. This is a very convenient ability to possess since it allows you to side-step any conscience you may still possess. The fact is, however, that you Richard are acting directly against the public good and are responsible, personally, for ensuring that every person, and in particular children and firefighters, in this country will continue to be poisoned in their own homes for many years to come. I hope whatever rewards and promotions you receive in the civil service are worth it.
Regards,
Terry Edge
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