From my journal, 13th December 2018
 
The first phase of the Grenfell Inquiry ends tomorrow, exactly 18 months from the day of the fire. This week, there have been various summings-up and a few last minute desperate claims of innocence. For example, the head of Whirlpool (which owns Hoover) made the extraordinary claim that the fire was started not by an electrical fault in the Hoover fridge-freezer alleged to have been the cause but by someone on the 4th floor (say) dropping a cigarette which then blew into the flat below to set light to the same fridge-freezer. As has so far been typical of the Inquiry, absolutely no investigation into what might be behind this statement has been made. But here's a bit of my dot-joining thoughts on it:
 

• BEIS recently passed as safe both the actual model that caught fire and the product type (owned by Whirlpool) but in practice tried to hide the test report that actually shows there was/is a serious fire-risk in this product (as reported by electrical experts to the All Party Parliamentary Fire Safety and Rescue Group)

 

• BEIS obviously wants attention kept off of products that caught fire in the tower, and certainly those that are faulty like flammable furniture that isn't supposed to be

 

• Intertek, a test house not a group of "independent technical experts" as claimed, were commissioned by BEIS in contempt of proper procurement rules for government departments, perhaps because Intertek does a lot of testing work for white goods manufacturers

 

• BEIS has utterly failed to do anything about Whirlpool washing machines which keep catching fire, despite being heavily criticised by the BEIS Select Committee Chair

 
Which might or might not explain why the head of Whirlpool would make such a claim about a flying cig based on absolutely no evidence, rather than cite the 60+ page Intertek report that exposes his products as a fire risk (even if BEIS has lied about its findings)
 
Tonight, I listened to the BBC's summing-up of the Inquiry so far. They did their usual "balanced" report, claiming for example that Grenfell residents/survivors are split equally between those who think the Inquiry is doing a good job and those who don't. Really? Every resident that I've spoken to is utterly disillusioned with the Inquiry.
 
A few days ago, Judge Moore-Bick announced that Phase 2 won't start until the end of 2019 at the earliest, possibly into 2020, despite it originally having been scheduled for spring 2019. He puts this down to the fact the Inquiry will be releasing the 200,000 documents accumulated so far (but only to Core Participants). This "work won't be complete until Autumn next year," he says. "There is lots to do and it's likely to identify new questions . . . however, careful and detailed preparation which enables us to focus on the aspects of the programme that are of real significance should make it possible to ensure that the proceedings, once begun, can be completed within a reasonable time." (My emphasis.)
 
Here we see the casual but utterly deliberate establishment tried and tested tricks – the self-selected undefined timings; the false conflations; the unjustified linear assignments to tasks that could and should be running in tandem. For example, note that he calls the distribution of documents "work", when it clearly isn't: it's something that could easily have been going on simultaneously with the other work over the past 18 months. Also incredibly, in saying that when they start again they should be able to get to the really significant stuff, he is dismissing the 18 months work done so far. 
 
Grenfell residents meanwhile are exhausted, ill and suffering from grief and stress. So far, they've seen absolutely no justice at all and precious little truth. A year is a very long time, and my gut feeling is that this is designed to kill off the residents, both as in their challenge and perhaps even to a degree literally. This is how we do things in this country: what is supposed to be an Inquiry for the benefit of the people who suffered from the fire is clearly and more or less cynically built entirely around the needs of the establishment, both industry and government.
 
Moore-Bick also said he was "particularly grateful" for the 307 statements received from those who have lost relatives, survivors, and local residents.
 
But what he's actually saying is that those statements fell into Phase 1 which is not the significant part of the Inquiry. This, believe me, will be the reason given much later in the day, couched in more subtle words of course, for why the Inquiry has done absolutely no investigative work into those statements, and challenged nothing in any of the other witness statements it has received over the past 18 months.
 
 

One of the mostly unseen effects of the Grenfell Tower fire has been to get officials from different government departments communicating with each other for a change, albeit behind closed doors. It would be nice to think that this is in order to pool knowledge towards providing survivors with the full truth about, for example, the toxicity they were exposed to. Unfortunately, it seems as if this collusion is designed to do little more than protect business interests and the backs of civil servants who do not have the guts to stand up to them and have their own mistakes to cover. 
 
At one such secret meeting last year, an official from BEIS stated that his department knows that the Furniture Regulations don't work but doesn't know what to do about it. Hold that thought.
 
On 18thDecember 2018, Defra published "Our Waste, Our Resources: A Strategy for England" which can be accessed here. In the Ministerial Foreword, Michael Gove states:

"Our goal is to maximise the value of the resources we use, minimise the waste we create, cut emissions and help create a cleaner, greener, healthier planet. 

"By making sure that manufacturers and producers bear a heavier financial burden for the pollution they cause, the Strategy fully upholds the ‘polluter pays’ principle.
 
"And by protecting the natural world, and leaving it in a healthier state for the next generation, it will help us uphold a core pledge of our 25 Year Environment Plan." 

Which sounds good and indeed the press, where it can be bothered to, has picked up mainly on this intention to get industry to clean up its own rubbish. But let's look a bit more closely at how Defra has also made up its own rules inside this strategy that are directly in defiance of the Stockholm Convention (which the UK is signed up to), to allow mass chemical pollution to continue via upholstered furniture. 
 
For a start, there is not a single mention in this strategy of flame retardants (just one to "chemicals" – see below), despite the fact the UK is the largest polluter of the environment with regard to these chemicals in domestic products.
 
Flame retardants are Persistent Organic Pollutants, and here's what the Stockholm Convention says about POPs:

1) They are highly toxic; 
2)  they are persistent, lasting for years or even decades before degrading into less dangerous forms; 
3)  they evaporate and travel long distances through the air and through water; and 
4)  they accumulate in fatty tissue. 

As stated elsewhere on this site, UK homes contain the highest levels of flame retardant dust in the world, mainly because of our tough (but largely useless) Furniture Regulations.
 
Okay, time to step back a few years. Towards the end of 2013, I arranged a meeting at BEIS (BIS as it was then) with a group of furniture industry representatives, to bring them up to date with the changes we wanted to make to the Furniture Regulations. Changes that would have seen a huge reduction in brominated flame retardants in cover fabrics (BFRs are extremely toxic). Their reaction was less than enthusiastic, it has to be said, but at the time we didn't realise the full extent of their collusion with the chemical industry. I'd also invited a colleague from the Environment Agency to give a talk on the Stockholm Convention and how it was due to rule soon that products containing flame retardants like DecaBDE (ubiquitous in UK furniture at the time) would need to be disposed of safely. And that would be a very expensive process. Well, that certainly got their attention . . . so much so, that a delegation from the furniture industry travelled to Brussels soon after to put a case to the European Commission. Was this to support our proposal to remove harmful FRs from furniture? No, it was to try to get the Commission to let them off the likely huge disposal costs. "But we have a mountain of sofas and mattresses in the UK to dispose of!" they bleated. "Tough," said the Commission; "that's the UK's problem."
 
Then again, maybe they're breathing a little easier now, if they've seen the Environment Agency's record on enforcements, i.e. down from around 130 a year in 2012 to around just 15 in 2018 (see graph at end of this blog). The EA has of course been commissioned to undertake a study into the toxicity of the Grenfell Tower fire. Will that put up their enforcement figures? It's hard to tell since the EA has gone totally silent on this project.

Now, here's what's required of any nation that signs up to the Stockholm Convention:
 
a)    Develop and implement appropriate strategies for identifying stockpiles, products and articles in use that contain or are contaminated with POPs;
b)    Manage stockpiles and wastes in an environmentally sound manner;
c)    Dispose of waste so that the POPs content is destroyed or irreversibly transformed;
d)    Not permit the recycling, recovery, reclamation, direct reuse or alternative use of the POPs;
e)  Endeavour to develop strategies for identifying contaminated sites and perform eventual remediation in an environmentally sound manner.

Let's see how the UK deals with furniture under these requirements:
 
a) We'll come to the strategy as such in a moment but in terms of identifying stockpiles, etc, contaminated with POPs, basically the UK doesn't, other than citing a "mountain" of furniture. We don't even know what's in an individual sofa or mattress, just that it's a variety of FR chemicals.
b) At present, most sofas and mattresses at end-life go into landfill, where FRs leach out and get into water, soil and the food chain.
c) Virtually no furniture waste is disposed of safely in the UK.
d) The UK allows second-hand furniture containing toxic FRs to be re-sold.
e) As far as furniture's concerned, I'm not aware of any such identification that has been carried out.
 
In light of this, you'd expect the UK's new Waste Strategy to provide a solution. Well, if you turn to page 39 you'll find a section headed: "Invoking the 'polluter pays' principle and harnessing the potential of EPR for other waste streams". (EPR stands for Extended Producer Responsibility.)
 
On the face of it, then, this is the furniture industry's nightmare made flesh: as the producer they will have to take responsibility and, well, pay as the main polluter. Excellent: at last we'll safely get rid of the millions of kilograms of toxic FRs in our furniture and, because they'll have to pay, they'll stop putting new FRs in new furniture too.
 
Or not. Because on the same page we find this:

"Extended producer responsibility can help deal with those items and products which cannot be classified as hazardous waste, for example soft furnishings that contain chemicals which were legal at time of manufacture but which have subsequently been banned."
 
This is an extraordinary statement in that it completely defies the Stockholm Convention. It even contradicts existing UK government policy, e.g. on asbestos – because this statement rules that anything that contains asbestos is not hazardous waste if asbestos was legal at the time of manufacture. Er, so why all that effort to have it removed and disposed of safely that's been going on since 1999? Why do local authorities provide an asbestos collection service to its citizens? Shouldn't they also be offering a collection service for sofas and mattresses that contain toxic and banned flame retardants? Apparently not because Defra reckons there is a difference between one kind of hazardous waste and another; it just isn't explaining what exactly.
 
Let's translate what this statement actually means with regard to soft furnishings:
 
a) The literally millions of sofas/mattresses that contain now-banned FRs like DecaBDE can remain in UK homes because Defra has decided they're not hazardous waste.
b) When they come to the end of their life, we can continue slinging them into landfill.
c) Furniture manufacturers can continue the process of stuffing furniture with the latest FRs that only the FR industry reckon are safe, and when they're later banned do nothing about it.
 
Are there any hidden motives behind this policy?
 
Let's call this speculation for now, but here are a few possibles:

• If BEIS was to tell the furniture industry that under the Stockholm Convention they must pay to dispose of old furniture safely, the industry would publicly hammer them with the fact that it's BEIS's fault they've continued to use tons of FRs, i.e. because in 2014 BEIS proved the furniture regulations mostly don't work but has refused to put them right.

 

• If furniture containing FRs is (rightly) deemed 'hazardous waste' then clearly Grenfell Tower was stuffed with it and the resulting fire highly toxic. This would again impact on BEIS because as said they've refused to put the regulations right. It would also impact on the furniture industry since they've known for at least five years that they're selling toxic products. And it would impact on the flame retardant industry because their products contributed hugely to the UK's worst domestic fire since the war.

 

• If furniture in Grenfell Tower was hazardous then the Environment Agency will be compelled to start their investigation into the toxicity of the fire from the clear foundation that it was indeed toxic. With this ruling by Defra, however, wriggle room is introduced, i.e. they can claim furniture was not hazardous, which on the surface is ludicrous but shallow claims are surprisingly effective in a country that provides no oversight on its government departments.

 

• The cost of disposal of furniture at end-life would be huge. But if it's revealed that industry was knowingly supplying UK consumers with hazardous products, the costs could escalate and perhaps even be lethal. Law suits would abound, and the government itself would not be exempt from being prosecuted.

 
Let's just remind ourselves that this waste management policy was put together by public servants. It's supposed to protect our health and the environment. Which means that the provision it's introduced to de-hazard toxic furniture and thereby allow industry to continue poisoning all of us forever (unless something or someone intervenes and with Brexit looming that seems unlikely) is either an act of extraordinary incompetence. Or it's something else entirely.


​

To get to the full truth of anything it's often necessary to look not just at the immediate factors but also at many other, sometimes apparently lateral or even non-conformist, issues which, when joined up can reveal an even bigger truth. And where people and money are concerned, it's prudent to assume there is more than a little interest in both obscuring the dots themselves and making sure they don't get joined up. 
 
So far at least, the Grenfell Inquiry, Hackitt Review and independent experts panel has done very little dot-joining. Pretty much every subject is treated as if separate. For example, while cladding has been massively focussed on, no one has looked at the links between it and furniture, carpets, curtains, bedding. One such link being that they are all fuel sources; another that they often contain flame retardant chemicals. With the Grenfell residents currently very concerned about how their health has been affected by the toxicity of the fire, and given that when flame retardant chemicals burn they massively increase toxic fumes/smoke, you would have thought this was an obvious step to take. Yet instead we get the government and the council so far failing to even look for toxicity in soil, debris, human blood, etc, claiming (apparently clairvoyantly) that they do not need to because toxicity is 'low'.
 
There is a group of us working on joining the dots, however. And for the purposes of this blog I thought I'd give just one example. Below, to this end, I've put together some facts and quotes, along with a few background points that may or may not be relevant. In short, I'll lay down some dots and leave it to the reader to join them, or not. Please bear in mind that these are just a few of the dots within the overall picture, one that is shaping much of what goes on, or doesn't, at the Grenfell Inquiry.
 

• From 2008 until earlier this year, Dave Sibert was the National Fire Safety Advisor and IRMP Advisor to the Fire Brigades Union, a paid role that came with an FBU credit card.

 

• Around May 2018, Sibert was forced to resign from this post, although this has not been publicly announced by the FBU. Here's what Sibert himself says about it in an article dated 7 September 2018:

 
"THERE IS supposed to be an ancient Chinese curse, which reads: ‘May you live in interesting times’. After the tragic fire at Grenfell Tower last year, those of us in the fire industry have certainly been ‘living in interesting times’. The curse appeared to point its crooked finger at me when I was forced to resign from my previous job, although in the end resignation gave me the opportunity to take up the challenging – but very rewarding – role of head of the special projects group (SPG) at the FPA [Fire Protection Association]."
 

• Sibert was given this new paid post at the FPA by Jon O'Neill, Managing Director of the Fire Protection Association.

 

• The FPA is funded by the insurance industry. The insurance industry is preoccupied with protecting property from fire. The flame retardant industry claims its products do so.

 

• UK homes have the highest levels of flame retardant dust in the world, the main reason being our unique and very stringent furniture flammability regulations.

 

• In 2014, the FPA signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US's National Fire Protection Association.

 

• The NFPA consistently supports the flame retardant industry in first trying to block then to overturn the decision by California to drop its open flame furniture test in 2014 – which meant that flame retardant chemicals were no longer necessary in California/US furniture. For example, also in 2014, the NFPA supported a lawsuit by one of the big three world-wide flame retardant producers, Chemtura, against the state of California, insisting on the retention of the open flame test which would lead to the retention of millions of kgs of flame retardants in US furniture.

 

• In 2014/2015, Dave Sibert, Jon O'Neil, Paul Fuller and Sir Ken Knight played a major role, working together, to block safety changes to the UK's furniture regulations that would have led to a massive drop in flame retardants in cover fabrics. For example, in 2014, Dave Sibert wrote the FBU's response to the government's proposal to make the furniture regulations safe. It was entirely negative albeit with absolutely no evidence by way of support. This contrasted sharply with the many very positive returns from individual fire services, including the London Fire Brigade who applauded the proposals that would make furniture fire-safer and made some useful suggestions for other improvements.

 

• Sibert, O'Neil, Fuller and Knight, however,  succeeded and such safety changes are still pending. In the meantime, UK furniture continues to contain the highest levels of flame retardants in the world.

• Paul Fuller resigned his post in May 2018 as Chair of the Fire Sector Federation after just a year, "for a variety of reasons", at the same time as Sibert was forced to resign his post at the FBU.

 

• Paul Fuller requested an invitation to a British Standards meeting in 2015 to discuss what to do about flammable children's fancy dress outfits. He opened his introductory talk by stating, "I'm not here today to advocate for flame retardants in children's clothing . . . "

 

• As can be seen elsewhere on this blog, in late 2017, I publicly challenged the four people named above to explain why they had not done the extra work they'd talked a Minister into agreeing to on the furniture regs' new match/open flame test, with the result that UK furniture remains stuffed with flame retardants and is not fire-safe. None of them answered.

 

• Following the Grenfell fire, Dave Sibert and the FBU were often quoted in the press, strongly in support of the Stay Put policy, right up until March this year; for example:

'Fire Brigades Union safety expert David Sibert has said: “The principle that tower blocks are built on is that every flat is a fire-resisting box, every flat is completely surrounded by fire-resisting construction from the rest of the building. So you should be able to set fire to your own flat and leave it to completely burn out and it won’t affect anybody else in the building.”' Guardian, 12 July 2017

'Dave Sibert, the Fire Brigades Union’s fire safety adviser and chairman of a national committee on fire safety standards, told the newspaper that if the "stay put" advice was not in place during the incident, some of the 60-plus people saved may have been injured or worse if they were fleeing the building.' The Sun, 25 May 2018
 
'We do not agree that firefighters on the ground had concluded within 10 minutes that nobody should stay in their flats to await rescue. We simply do not know the evidence at this stage. There is no evidence that we are aware of so far that any such policy was scrapped within 10 minutes. We are aware that residents were actually rescued from their flats until very late into the incident.'  FBU press release 25 May, 2018
 

• However, Sibert appears to have now changed his view or at least to have moderated it. From a slide presentation he made around July this year:

3.58 STAY PUT STRATEGY 

STRATEGY NORMALLY ADOPTED IN BLOCKS OF FLATS AND MAISONETTES WHEREBY, WHEN A FIRE OCCURS IN A FLAT OR MAISONETTE, THE OCCUPANTS OF THAT DWELLING EVACUATE, BUT OCCUPANTS OF ALL OTHER DWELLINGS CAN SAFELY REMAIN IN THEIR DWELLINGS UNLESS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY HEAT AND SMOKE OR DIRECTED TO LEAVE BY THE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE 

SOURCE: BS 9991

There is a contradiction here with his earlier statements to the press, i.e. the standard BS 9991 says the Stay Put policy should 'normally' be adopted, whereas Sibert had earlier insisted it applies to 'every flat'.
 
The standard goes on to say that people should stay put (if the fire is in another flat) unless directly affected by heat or smoke. Again, Sibert earlier is very clear that you must stay put whatever, even stating that any flat that is on fire can completely burn out and it 'won't affect anybody else in the building'. 
 
He appears to be using the standard to set up his change of direction since later in the presentation he states:

1. IN A POORLY BUILT HIGH RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING, A STAY PUT EVACUATION STRATEGY SHOULD NOT BE PUT IN PLACE. AND 
2. WHEN FIRE SPREADS THROUGH A POORLY BUILT HIGH RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING, A STAY PUT EVACUATION STRATEGY DISAPPEARS. NONE OF IT CAN BE APPLIED. 

Neither of these two points was made by him before. But they nicely backwards-cover the emerging evidence at Grenfell, i.e. that 'stay put no matter what' was the wrong policy.
Then he comes up with a statement that contradicts his new view but which is perhaps intended to exonerate his previous view:

WHEN FIRE SPREADS THROUGH A POORLY BUILT HIGH RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING, FIREFIGHTERS MAY HAVE TO SAY TO RESIDENTS STAY WHERE YOU ARE, WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO RESCUE YOU

'May' is probably significant here in that it creates wriggle room for him. But to repeat his earlier post-Grenfell view: 
 
"[Sibert] told the newspaper that if the "stay put" advice was not in place during the incident, some of the 60-plus people saved may have been injured or worse if they were fleeing the building."
 
He's very clearly stating that more people would have died at Grenfell if they had not stayed put and instead tried to flee the building. Yet everyone, including the FBU, always knew that Grenfell Tower was a 'poorly built high rise residential building' of which Sibert now says a stay put policy cannot 'be applied'. Back to 'may' again.
 
I'll end with another of Sibert's slides which pretty much sums up the massive contradictions between Sibert's earlier and later views on Stay Put:

Two ‘classes’ of high rise residential building 

1. THOSE WITH THE FULL PACKAGE OF FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS WHERE STAY PUT EVACUATION IS SUITABLE. 
2. THOSE WITH SERIOUS FAILINGS IN THEIR FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS WHERE STAY PUT EVACUATION IS NOT SUITABLE. 
3. There are buildings where the stay put evacuation strategy is inappropriate. 
4. This [sic] NOT because there is anything wrong with the stay put strategy. 
5. It IS because there are buildings out there with inadequate fire precautions and fire safety systems. 

• The flame retardant industry has a history of funding/bribing fire sector officials: proof of this where Bob Graham and Mike Hagen are concerned is in the public domain. It's an open secret within the fire sector that there are other currently serving officials taking money from the FR industry. 

 
 

Extract from my journal, 30th June 2015
 
At our team meeting today, the two main discussion topics are Steve’s position as Technical Advisor and lines to take at FW/6. 
 
[Background: FW/6 was the technical committee at British Standards responsible for furniture flammability. John Lord deliberately informed Jo Swinson, the Minister, that I had brought a Civil Service Code case against my managers – for failing to implement the new match test in April 2015. This gave her no choice but to ignore my government response to the 2014 consultation and instead choose Lord’s. His was a put-up job which would have delighted industry in that it instigated at least another year’s delay in bringing in the match test. The main justification he gave for this was to say that we needed to get FW/6 to provide more input to the test (which we didn’t, of course). The meeting with them was looming and there were complications, not least of which was that Steve had just been elected as the new Chair of FW/6 . . . ]
 
Chris’s opening comment about the upcoming FW/6 meeting says it all, really: “We’re covered because the Minister didn’t promise anything.” She means, of course, that John’s published government response that he conned past the Minister didn’t promise anything. And even then, that’s not strictly true; the response’s Next Steps actually say:

“The aim of this would be to enable BIS to launch a new consultation early in the next Parliament, covering all the proposed changes to the Regulations which stem from the stakeholder discussions outlined above, complete with draft regulations, guidance and further technical explanations. 

“This would in principle enable the full review to be completed by April 2016.”
 
Maybe one day, Swinson will realise that when she instructed her officials to get the new match test in by April 2016, they actually made sure that was going to be an uphill task, i.e. by changing the aim, without her permission, to – as it says above – getting a review of allthe Regulations in by that time (no chance) and even then, it’s only ‘in principle’. If future historians ever want to work out why millions of UK citizens continued to be poisoned by the furniture in their own homes long after it was necessary, they should head for these ‘Next Steps’ by Mr Lord (not his real name) and see just how powerful a single mendatious sociopathic civil servant can be when he has a wealthy and rewarding industry to suck up to.
 
Barbara’s solution to the ‘Steve problem’ (i.e. he’s now Chair of FW/6) is one of two options:
 
1)         British Standards are asked to provide a stand-in Chair for this particular meeting. Steve of course can still speak.
 
2)         Steve is asked to step out of the room when the BIS material is discussed.
 
Here in all its glory is the senior civil servant’s extraordinary hubris. Because, it hasn’t occurred to Barbara for a moment that this is FW/6’s meeting, not BIS’s; not hers to control. She, like most of her kind, spends her entire time telling lower ranks what to do and think; therefore assumes an outside body will allow her to do the same. She also has already forgotten the farce she caused by trying to railroad a group of test experts not so long ago – particularly the part where she was literally stamping her feet and crying, “You’re not listening to me!”
 
On 2) even John can’t restrain himself from pointing out that allthe material at this meeting is BIS’s.
 
Barbara has also only just noticed that Steve is still our technical advisor, and has decided to let him go. She says that she, Chris and I will phone him on Thursday to give him the news. 
 
Then it’s time to discuss what lines we’ll take at FW/6 and things get a bit fruity. Sorry, when I say ‘we’, I do of course mean ‘Terry’. Because, while I have to listen to these higher ranks talking well-enunciated bollocks, it’s me who’s going to have to face a roomful of vested interests at FW/6. Sorry, when I say ‘fruity’ I reall mean ‘fruit and nutty’. 
 
John is now annoyed because British Standards have not actually done anything since he and Barbara coerced them into agreeing to look further at the regs, and they’ve now only got one month left to do so, if we’re to meet the new deadline of implementing in April 2016. Not that he wants to meet the deadline necessarily but he does want to be seen to be ‘doing something’. He thinks it’s down to bad adminstration at BS and doesn’t react when I point out that the Minister agreed with them having 12 months in which to do the ‘work’ – it’s John who changed it. I point out further that Sir Ken and the others had won 12 months off Swinson and were not going to now agree to just 6. He doesn’t like me saying this of course, since he made this change without Swinson’s permission. Incredibly he then suggests, and the rest agree, that I should tell them they’ve got a month to deliver. This is the same John, of course, who remained utterly silent a few months back when Sir Ken bullied us into the 12 months in the first place.
 
I remind them that weasked for this meeing with BS and that making such a demand will only cause bad feeling. And then the ultimate irony – John says I should tell them, tough, get on with it, and if they come and complain to the Minister, so be it. 
 
And true to form, he then decrees that Chris and I need to work out the actual lines to take for the meeting since he has other things to be ‘doing something’ about.
 
Had a long talk with Steve this evening. He was quite amused at his forthcoming ‘sacking’ as our technical advisor. He’d already told UKTLF that he was no longer in that role anyway. Oh, and UKTLF [association of test houses] have decided that the match test is ready to go and are considering challenging our commission to British Standards on the grounds that it’s unnecessary. If they do that, Steve as Chair of FW/6, will put me on the spot to defend BIS’s commission. Please do, I said. That should make an interesting ‘line’ to discuss with Chris tomorrow. He also said he’ll stick it to Barbara in her phone call to him by commenting on what a great job Terry has been doing on the match test. 
 
He also said that in persisting with this, it’s uncovered just how corrupt the industry is. But the problem with that is it will just increase the cover-up and it’s the UK consumer who’ll suffer. 
 
Which is the eternal dilemma of anyone who’s trying to do the right thing. While the bought just throw statements and commands that don’t stand up to any kind of honest scrutiny, the good guys have to spend much time explaining why the evidence suggests they can’t do things that way. They also face the problem in doing so of how much they reveal that they’re on to them. Because once the bad guys know you know they can of course shift their machinations to one side, thereby causing you a whole barrel more work.
 
In other words, while Barbara and John decree that they have other things to do so can’t face FW/6 and the many guests scheduled to come, including Sir Ken Knight, it’s me who’ll be standing in front of a whole gaggle of mixed and overlapping vested interests (since there’s no way Chris will do so [and in the event she did indeed cry off sick at the last minute]). It’s me who has had to spend the past few years getting up to speed so they can’t overwhelm me with techno-babble. It’s me who’s spent eleven years building solid relations with them so that I can at least resist them without it getting too acrimonious. It’s me who once again will have to look Sir Ken in the eye and face up to that well-connected, calmly overbearing, establishment-backed “You will do as I say” command. 
 
Why will I do this? Because it would be wrong not to.
 
 
 
 

We now know that while Grenfell Tower was still burning and for days following, officials of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea council were holed up in their offices planning their denials and busily shredding incriminating papers, doing nothing at all to help stricken citizens. The government was busy with its urgent priorities, too, one of which was shaping the Inquiry to minimise damage across a whole range of interests, including its own, in particular the bodge it had made of buildings and fire regulations over the past thirty years or so. That and the fact it was directly responsible for failing to put right the furniture flammability regulations when it had the chance to some four years previous to the fire. 
 
There were plenty of well-compensated officials in government and the fire sector who would have received their orders almost as soon as the building caught fire. Oh, and let's not forget the flame retardant industry. After all, they had markets to protect, and it didn't help that outside the UK, the western world had largely turned against its products in furniture. So much so that it had been expanding into building materials instead. But it clearly wouldn't do if the truth got out that its products in sofas and mattresses in the tower were obviously not doing the job of preventing fire; worse still, they added greatly to the toxicity of the blaze. And so Dr Malcolm Tunnicliff was rushed into the media, while the fire was still burning, to assure everyone that there was no hydrogen cyanide poisoning (actually there was, and lots of it) and only old furniture (pre-1988) was toxic; modern furniture was not. Now, a common theme amongst those with something to lose from tragedies like Grenfell is that when they are pushed into an ethical and logical corner regarding, in this case, their lies, they simply don't respond. And so Dr Tunnicliff did not respond when I wrote to him to point out that he'd got the issue with furniture exactly the wrong way round, i.e. modern furniture is far more toxic than older stuff when it burns.
 
Meanwhile, a shocked and devastated community had to look after itself. 
 
There was an interesting moment, following the end of a meeting in June this year at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. We were being escorted from the meeting room to the reception via the lifts by, well, I'll call her Doris for now, since civil servants are very sensitive about being named in public. Even though they're public servants. 
 
Incredibly, considering what had gone on in the meeting, Doris was smiling and actually skipping a little with some kind of self-induced pleasure. She then made small talk by asking us what we were doing next. Instead of answering that particular question, however, I decided to try popping her joy bubble by saying, "You met the All Party Parliamentary Fire Safety and Rescue Group yesterday and they're hopping mad that you didn't answer any of their questions either."
 
I watched her carefully. The jolly sheen in her eyes dimmed for about half a second but then quickly returned. "We had a meeting with them, yes," she beamed.
 
As we left the building I said to my colleague, "She believes the meeting went well because she thinks she dealt with us. She'll tell her line manager everything's fine and probably get a positive mention in her annual report."
 
Move forward to last week. I'd put in some questions to the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (along with many other people) regarding their complete inability to acknowledge, let alone deal with, the fall-out of the fire in terms of sickness and environmental damage. One of my questions was what is the Council doing about the fact the government proved four years ago the furniture flammability regulations don't work and therefore they contributed greatly to the toxicity of the fire? Well, RBKC contacted BEIS for a statement. Doris would have provided it and what she put forward was the same stock response BEIS has been giving for over a year - that they're still working on the regulations but must not do anything that would reduce fire safety.
 
Compartmentalisation. In our meeting with Doris, I had asked a similar question about twenty times: do you agree that your own evidence proves that the current match test fails in up to 90% of cases and therefore UK sofas are unsafe? She would not reply. The closest she got was to say the government believes the regulations can be improved.
 
To state that BEIS must not do anything to reduce furniture fire safety when they themselves have already proved it doesn't exist is clearly a lie. Doris lied. How can a civil servant lie in a public statement, especially when the result of that lie means millions of people are being poisoned in their own homes, and the Grenfell Tower fire was worse than it should have been?
 
Compartmentalisation. At one point in our meeting, I asked Doris about the sofa in her own home and the fact that it is toxic both in normal use and especially if it catches fire. I watched her eyes cloud briefly, sensing a trap - a trap, for God's sake! Yes, a trap of the truth - finally, she said, "I don't feel that my sofa is unsafe." Bear in mind, this is the woman who is responsible for these failing regulations that right now are damaging the health of thousands, perhaps millions of children. "And what are your feelings based on?" I said, "against the hard evidence on your own department's website that proves your sofa isn't safe." She didn't respond, presumably because to do so might have weakened the compartmentalisation protecting her from having to actually do some work. 
 
Doris, by the way, has been full time on the furniture regulations for around two years. She's even received a promotion in post, her salary now around £50K a year. When I asked her where they'd got with interliners (a proposal for which is in the 2016 consultation document that they are still apparently 'working' on) she said, "What's an interliner?"
 
This, in a nutshell, is how the establishment - government, local authorities, fire services and police at management levels - works. It is not there to help/protect the public. It exists to protect and reward itself. Similarly, the leadership of RBKC does not exist to protect its citizens; it exists as a career platform for itself. Like BEIS, it compartmentalises in order to allow it to lie, essentially. And when it's presented with the truth in such a way that threatens that compartmentalisation, it will just go silent, like Dr T.
 
So it is that the Leader of the Council, Elizabeth Campbell, has gone silent on me. As detailed on the Grenfell Tower Fire page of this site, after she mentioned that I'd raised the issue of the furniture regs at a recent RBKC meeting (well, she didn't have much choice), I wrote back offering to bring her up to speed on one of the main contributors to the fire. She didn't reply. I wrote a reminder. Again, she didn't reply. 
 
And thus the Leader of RBKC joins the long list of others who do not reply either, such as Sir Ken Knight, Dame Judith Hackitt, the Inquiry, BEIS, MHCLG, the GMB, Matt Wrack of the FBU; and Dave Sibert also of the FBU but recently and mysteriously stripped of his job there.
 
Silence, of course, should be damning, a sure indication of cowardice and mendacity. But it often works in the UK, unfortunately, simply because the recourse of the ordinary person is much more limited than it should be. The press used to be a reliable recourse but they are mostly hamstrung these days, by rich owners who do not want their rich mates pursued, and/or by the fear of legal action. There is a TV journalist who has been following the Grenfell fire since the beginning. I had a long conversation with him once about the role the furniture regs played in the fire. He was very interested but he didn't report on it. Later, I found out that he'd suffered from thyroid cancer. Thyroid conditions are one of the more well-established effects of flame retardant chemicals the like of which will be in this journalist's furniture in large amounts. I wrote to him about this. He didn't reply, although he's still reporting on Grenfell. Just not on the bit about furniture and flame retardants.
 
Yes, in a way you know you're right when they don't reply. The trouble is, they're surrounded by many others of a like mind, who also don't reply.

Extract from my journal, 25thJune 2015
 
I remembered today that in fact I have the power, not my bosses. The longer I stay in the job and with the Civil Service Code case continuing, that power is strengthened. Barbara, for example, keeps trying to find different ways to move the project forward but only by pretending she didn’t cause any problems in the first place. But everywhere she goes, I have her blocked – with truth, integrity and knowledge. 
 
For example, yesterday I was discussing her dismissal letter to Steve [she’d forgotten that he’s still our technical adviser and for reasons as usual undisclosed decided she’d better formally let him go] with my union guy, Carl. He stopped me at one point and said, “Hold on – she’s dismissed him? That should be in your case.”
 
And he was right. I’d missed it because I’ve almost grown used to their casual, but essentially lying, way of dealing with stakeholders, including those who’ve contributed enormously to the public good and for no reward, financially or otherwise. 
 
What had happened was this . . . a couple of weeks ago, David King [at the time heading Flexible Foam Research, a two-man operation acting as a front group for the British Plastics Federation, big advocates of flame-retarded foam] sent John a ‘technical paper’. It purported to prove how the new match test isn’t going to work – but most of it the same old opinion-expressed-as-fact crap; and he ended it somewhat arrogantly/aggressively by listing ‘acknowledgements’ in the form of FIRA, FRETWORK, the Fire Protection Association, etc – the usual snouts in the FR trough suspects. Anyway, John and Barbara didn’t of course understand it and passed it to me, without actually admitting so of course. I told them to ignore him – let FW/6 deal with it [FW/6 was the British Standards Institute’s working group on furniture flammability – an upcoming meeting was scheduled very soon to discuss the progress, as such, of the new test] – that it’s just a shot across the bows. The only thing of significance is that he twice mentions ‘extra work/research’ that’s needed for the new test. He, along with the likes of Dave Sibert, Paul Fuller, Jon O’Neill, have been saying this for months, of course, but without ever saying what it entails. Sorry – they have actually told us: it’s to commission British Standards to come up with a test foam formula even though we’ve already had one for the past 30 years.
 
Barbara, however, insisted on doing an analysis. Which she did. Then told me to look at it. Which I did. It was, as usual, almost entirely wrong about everything. I went round to her desk and said that his arguments are blown out by BS7176. Her face was a picture: a carefully arranged frown that mightbe saying, “Of course,” or more likely, “HELP! What the fuck do you mean?” She should know of course, since she heard Steve give the argument at the FPA meeting in the House of Commons meeting room some months back. But there you go: she’s forgotten and so just wasted time writing an ‘analysis’ that misses the major point. [At that meeting, King was banging on about how we must get the test foam formula right, or face thousands of fires, court cases, etc. Steve pointed out that a) the formula we’d proposed for the new test has been used for loose covers for 30 years without any problems, and b) where testing for BS7176 – for non-domestic furniture – is concerned, flame-resistant foam fillings are required but all test houses just use any old bits of foam they have lying around, again with no problems.]
 
So Barbara, frown deepening in what I think was meant to indicate intellectual foreknowledge, said, “Yes, of course,” then went on about how “We’ll pin them down at FW/6, and answer all their arguments.” [Anyone following this story will probably be able to guess that when FW/6 met, Barbara and John were nowhere to be seen, and Chris who was supposed to support me in the likely battering to come from the Skipton Mafia and their mates managed to turn up right at the end, well after the storm had subsided.]
 
Then Chris tried to prove to me that we don’t need a technical adviser but the best she could offer as to a reason why is because, “It’s all like Game of Thrones.” So I emailed Barbara just before she was going to send the dismissal letter to Steve, copying in everyone, including Samantha, to say:
 
The timing is wrong and so are your reasons. One of which is that now Steve has been elected Chair of FW/6 there is a potential conflict of interest (the irony of which would be enough to scorch the FR-treated pants of Burson Marsteller) but the independence of the FW/6 Chair is not an issue; no one, not even the FR guys are questioning Steve’s independence. And most crucially, who are you going to replace him with? As soon as it’s known we don’t have a TA we’ll get loads more reports from the likes of David King, written in technobabble which will just cause more delays (as intended). Ditching our TA will also be seen as us losing faith in the new match test. Finally, you know there is no one else with Steve’s brilliance and integrity.
 
Barbara emails back to say she’s glad these issues have been raised before she sends out the email to Steve, along with a dig at me for not raising them earlier – yes, B, but it actually takes me some time to work through all your machinations. She goes on to say she’s discussed this further with Samantha who has some ideas about how we can achieve our objectives. Whatfecking objectives? The only one that matters is to stop putting the public at risk. But here’s the thing: some time back, when all these problems began, I said to Samantha: I know these proposals are a bit complicated; why don’t I ask Steve to come in for a couple of hours and we can explain it all to you. She looked me in the eye and said, “No.” [Which I now believe is a clear indication that she’d been got at.] Oh, and Samantha also said we need to make sure we aren’t rude to Steve. Which, really does show their utter lack of understanding of anyone outside their nicely-mannered circle of pension-preserving collusion, because I’ve never seen Steve be offended by anything other than people lying to him and thinking he’s too stupid to see it.
 
And with that, Barbara walked right into my rat trap. I emailed back to say that finding other experts could be a problem since over the past several months BIS does not have a very good reputation. For example, we’d invited a group of test experts to a meeting at one-day’s notice last December then totally ignored their advice when it didn’t suit our agenda (I don’t of course mean ‘we’ here; I mean ‘Barbara’); that we are currently vacillating on more work/no work with British Standards who are looking on bemused; that the furniture/testing industry is a small world (roughly Skipton-sized as it happens).
 
Barbara then went quiet, and no one else replied to my points. Which is odd at one level, given that I had in effect just accused her and John of giving the department a bad reputation amongst our stakeholders. 
 
Back to my meeting with Carl . . . we decided that the best move for now is that I write to the big BIS chief, Martin Donnelly, and tell him that the department is in danger of being highly embarrassed when it transpires it’s keeping the entire British public at risk via fence-sitting civil servants. We’ll see if he has any more of a conscience than his senior managers.
 
Finally and perhaps the most revealing thing that happened this week: I’d deliberately left Richard Black [not his real name: the CEO of a very large chemical treatment company, one that Trading Standards had often found guilty of undertreating furniture fabrics] off the guest list for our upcoming stakeholder meetings. This is because a Trading Standards colleague tipped me off that they’re about to bust his company once again. But he found out about the meeting and demanded to be invited. So I wrote to our lawyer for a legal view and she replied that we probably shouldn’t invite him, given that he may be on the way to another prosecution. But John emailed in with a spurious (and suspicious) comparison about how the government is still talking to supermarkets even when they’re in breach of various regulations, and that we should invite Black on the same basis. 
 
This chilled me. Because Black is in thick with the FR producers, and with Andrew Stephenson MP, and is part of the Skipton Mafia. When I told Carl about John's actions later he suggested that it would probably work like this: the big 3 FR producers and/or Burson Marsteller and/or a big treatment company offer our man a well-paid job somewhere down the line. It’s not even illegal, as such, and can easily be covered by holding an ‘open’ interview for the post. Which makes sense, although I wouldn’t rule out hard cash. After all, the FR industry gave that US burns doctor a straight $250,000 to lie in court and big-up flame retardants. Given that our new match test could cost them around £50m a year, I’m sure they would gladly stump up at least a quarter mill to stop it going through.
 
 
 

From my journal, 16thJune 2015
 
[Here, I record details of two meetings on the same day which in many ways embody how my managers continued to put their pensions/industry liaisons/career fears before public safety.]
 
First today, we had a meeting at 10.00 with David Bolton, the new chair of the British Retail Consortium, and what a fucking shower my lot are. First, Phil is Chairing but doesn’t get to work until 10.02. He brings David up with him from the foyer, then has to excuse himself to change out of his sporty cycle gear (necessary, apparently, for his two-mile ride from the station to here, on a Brompton). He gets to the room by 10.15 but there’s only me and Victoria there with David: fourothers are due but are late. Phil and Vicky have a conversation about one of the absentees:
 
P: “Where’s Michael – is he coming?”
V: “I don’t know.”
P: “He’s meant to be here, isn’t he?”
V: “Who knows?” (She is only his line manager so why would she know?) “Do you want me to fetch him?” (He’s in the office, of course, but probably still having his breakfast which normally takes an hour or so.)
 
Michael finally rolls in at 10.20. While we’re waiting, David reminds me that he and I met at a very tough BRC meeting last year. Steve Owen and I had been invited to speak to a room full of retailers about the new match test. But unbeknown to us, David reminds me, Phil Reynolds of FIRA had spoken to them all first and really bad-mouthed the test, setting Steve and me up for a lot of negativity. But, David continues, we did a great job under pressure. “Make sure you tell Phil,” I say, but don’t mention Steve’s observation that all my managers had chickened out of the meeting in the first place.
 
At the start of the meeting, Phil does a lot of fast talking, covering strings of minor facts, intended to demonstrate that he knows ‘stuff’. When we get to furniture, he asks me to give an update. Which I do, after which David offers the following observations:
 

• A lot of the negative responses to BIS’s consultation were orchestrated by FIRA.
• FIRA have vested interests in being opposed to the match test
• The flame retardant producers and treatment industry are obviously opposed to the new test because they’re going to lose a lot of money
• [And to me with a sympathetic twinkle in his eye]: It must have been like wading through mud

 
I saw much significance in these comments but could tell that Phil either didn’t or didn’t want to. It looks as if the retailers are going to stand against the ‘No’ camp. Which makes sense since they will lose by further delays to the new test, e.g. David mentioned the public’s growing resistance to flame retardants and the problems of disposal of old sofas and mattresses, especially in light of the coming Stockholm Convention ruling on safe disposal of hazardous flame retardants at end-life.
 
Oh, and he also agreed with my suggestion that the chem boys/FIRA would use the overall amendments to the regulations to cause further delays to the new test (and all this was building nicely for what I had planned in the team meeting following this one).
 
Team Meeting
 
As I’d expected, Phil made no mention of the significance of David’s comments, so I brought it up, as far as I was allowed to. Then the others decided to look at everything other than the most important issue: the coming meeting at FW/6.
 
[Background: Sir Ken Knight, Paul Fuller, Jon O’Neill, Dave Sibert and others had persuaded the Minister, Jo Swinson, that she should commission the British Standards Institute to undertake 12-months ‘fast-track’ work on producing a new test foam formula for the new match test. No one wanted to listen to Steve and I pointing out that we already had a test foam formula in the existing regulations which had never produced any problems. In the event, Swinson agreed but Phil and Bridget were then in a bit of a pickle, i.e. if BIS went ahead and commissioned the work, then in 12 months time we’d be in the position of having no reason not to implement the new test and also having to explain why the hell we’d kept the public at risk for another year to produce a formula that already existed! Thus, Phil and Bridget changed the Minister’s recommendations in the government response published in March 2015, retaining the (frankly ridiculous) stuff about a new test foam formula, but a) changing Swinson’s directive that BSI be commissioned to do the work to just seeking their views on, and b) surrounding it in a huge amount of waffle, also not agreed by the Minister but guaranteed to ensure any changes were going to be delayed again – the response can be found here:
 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/456056/bis-15-140-consultation-on-amendments-to-the-furniture-and-furnishings-fire-safety-regulations.pdf
Note that the first suggestion talks again about finding ‘consensus’, despite Phil and Bridget being told by our Better Regulation unit that this is not possible and not necessary. Just for good measure, delay wise, they also added in that this attempt at consensus would now include allthe regulations, not just the match test: another recommendation never agreed by Swinson. Following, the publication of the government response, Phil and Bridget had persuaded BSI to hold a special meeting to discuss these items but both of them were clearly terrified of actually going along to explain it in person. Although I was currently in locked horns mode with them, they needed me to present at FW/6.]
 
Bridget was acting strange again: kept referring everything to me as if – IRONY ALERT! – I was the expert on the regs. I suspect this was her unsubtle way of saying, “It’s your arse on the line at FW/6, mate; don’t expect me to show my face.” Whatever, they wittered on about the forthcoming stakeholder meeting here in August, planning the order of events, discussing whether or not we need a facilitator . . . Good grief; the avoidance of the truth by diving into minor details was truly remarkable but not a million miles away I suppose from the Sir Humphrey playbook.
 
Then, probably sensing that I was suspiciously quiet, B announced that she had to leave early for another meeting; which suited me since now I had only one rat to trap. 
 
I pointed out that forces were gathering around the FW/6 meeting next month. Sir Ken Knight was attending as a guest, for a start. “Why would that be?” I asked but received only blank looks by return. “Could it be?” I went on, “That, following his success in getting us to agree to let BSI come up with a new test foam formula, he’s now going to push for us to let them take over amending the entire regulations?” Blank and blanker.
 
“Assuming I’m the one who has to face them,” I said, “I need two lines-to-take” and gave them my questions/suggestions of such.
 
First line: what do I say when they ask me why the Minister’s agreement – that BSI would be asked to spend 12 months on a new test foam formula, which was what they’d agreed was all that needed doing towards implementing the new test - has now had loads of other vague recommendations added to it including allthe regulations; and why we haven’t commissioned them to do this straight away, instead are now just asking for their ‘views’ on it (and the rest of the regs)?
 
Oh, boy, did this permafrost the atmosphere. The main rat saw the danger all right and said exactly what I expected him to: that the Minister had agreed to the drafting of the government response and not just the 12 months extra BSI work. To which I was able to say (since I’d checked all the emails) that the Minister had very clearly put in writing that, following the round table meeting in February, she wanted the 12 months BSI work to go ahead in order that the new match test would be implemented in April 2016 (there is of course no chance of that date being met now). But she did not agree to seeking consensus on all the rest of the regs. Phil repeated that she’d agreed to everything in the government response but we both know he’d slipped the extra stuff past her and besides, as I said, “That’s not what the stakeholders like Sir Ken believe is going to happen.”
 
In essense this is the trap the rats are now in:
 
Phil and Bridget allowed Sir Ken, O’Neill and Sibert, followed by the round table meeting, to advance the proposal that BIS undertake 12 months work on a new test foam formula that isn’t needed. Swinson was open to this at the meeting and confirmed it to us in writing afterwards. I’m the only BIS person to speak out against this unnecessary work – getting shouted at by Sir Ken for doing so – but now Phil is doing the same thing, albeit for very different reasons. He’s had to leave the new test foam thing in the response’s Next Steps but he’s also having to obscure it as much as possible, otherwise the work would get done and he and Bridget would have nowhere to hide.
 
So, in essence what Phil has done is this:
 

• Allowed the round table/FPA, Sir Ken, etc to believe they’d won the argument for 12 months BSI work
• Refused, at my request, to put Swinson right about the fact such work was not needed
• Got her to sign off the government response but without making it clear to her that he’d changed a) the commission for BSI to dothe work to just seeking their ‘views’ on it, and b) 12 months being changed to just a few months – in order to make the desired new implementation date of April 2016
• Further added things in the commissioning letter to BSI, now stating that we don’t in fact need anyextra work doing, just getting their views on the foam and the rest of the regulations while you’re at it

 
The wonderful irony is that in order to ‘answer’ my question about a line-to-take, he had to push further into the argument that BSI doesn’t consider that any more work is necessary. Well, they wouldn’t, especially with Steve being FW/6’s new Chair. 
 
The other line I said I needed was in response to BIS’s almost certain demand – especially with Sir Ken present – that they should be commissioned to produce a new standardfor all the testing requirements of the regulations. (Working with all the leading test houses a couple of years back, we’d established that it was best to do away with standards and instead put all the test requirements in the regulations – much to BSI’s horror, of course.) If we concede to that, I said, we’ll be looking at 3-5 years delay. The irony being that if Phil doesn’t want that to happen, he’s going to have to come up with a line to defend my work.
 
After Phil chewed his mental lips for a few seconds and threw sociopathic eye daggers at me, I put a proposal to them: that I put down a marker at FW/6 that as soon as we see that all the amendments to the regulations will not get in by April 2016 (which they clearly won’t), BIS will ensure that at least the new match test does. This is to defuse the delaying tactics, and we have the perfect reason: removing the current danger to public safety (something that Clare, our lawyer, was very strong about the other day).
 
Phil said that we’d need Ministerial approval for this (I resisted pointing out that the absence of such had not stopped him before); to which I agreed but said we can at least set out our intention at FW/6. To which he suggested – somewhat desperately, it has to be said – why not wait until we see how the FW/6 meeting pans out then think about suggesting something at the August stakeholder meeting? To which Chris, of all people, said, “It could be too late by then?” (Well, yes, that’s the point; glad you finally appear to see it.)
 
They decided that I should put all this in writing, which means I’m in the interesting position of having to set out in writing how they misled a Minister.
 
The bigger picture? In some ways, I saw it in David Bolton’s eyes earlier in the day (Phil wouldn’t have, of course): respect. The BRC were somewhat resistant to me and Steve at their meeting but I think they’ve had time to mull it over and see that he and I can be trusted, and that we know what we’re doing. Respect: something that Phil will neverget from anyone he deals with, stakeholders and colleagues alike. He may of course be getting something else from the chemical industry that for him is more important. 
 
 

The Grenfell Inquiry is taking a break at present and I thought it might be timely to set out a few pieces of new information and reminders regarding the part played in the fire by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS).
 
As covered in detail on this site, BEIS is refusing to make changes to the Furniture and Furnishings (Fire) (Safety) Regulations 1988, even though they know this is poisoning just about every person in the country and that the failures of the Regulations made the Grenfell fire worse than it needed to have been.
 
BEIS is refusing to respond to its 2016 consultation that once again proposed a new ‘match test’ that would put right the current failures and hugely reduce toxic flame retardants in UK furniture.
 
The current civil servant in charge of the Furniture Regulations has been in that post for nearly two years yet when questioned recently did not even know that the flammability requirements are modified British Standards. She also did not know what an interliner is.
 
In response to a FOI request made by the Grenfell Fire Forum, BEIS stated that it had had NO contact with the Grenfell Inquiry or the Dame Judith Hackitt review about the Furniture Regulations, e.g. to inform them that they are failing and therefore contributed to the fire. I questioned Dame Hackitt about this recently and she said that BEIS were working on the problems with the Regulations. So, who’s lying?
 
In January 2018, BEIS set up the new Office for Product Safety and Standards within itself, with a £3m budget. It has been criticised by the Chair of the BEIS select committee for doing nothing about Whirlpool washing machines which keep catching fire.
 
BEIS/OPSS were charged with investigating the fridge-freezer unit that is thought to have started the Grenfell fire. They issued a press release in May this year, stating that ‘experts’ had concluded that the risk from these units is low and therefore a recall is unnecessary. The APPG for Fire Safety and Rescue questioned the BEIS official about this, asking for the names of the experts and to see their work. This official – the same one that’s in charge of the Furniture Regulations - did not reply.
 
I put in a FOI request to BEIS asking the same questions and they responded to tell me the answers are at this link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hotpoint-fridge-freezer-ff175b-independent-investigation
 
However, this link was not given to the APPG and was not mentioned in BEIS’s press release. Strange. What could they be hiding? Well, we are currently looking into the test reports at that link and so far they look pretty dodgy, to say the least. Overall, BEIS is conflating two separate points, i.e. on the one hand, they’re saying that they tested second hand units of the same type as started the Grenfell fire to see if other such units in the UK need recalling but they don’t. On the other, they’re trying to imply that the actual unit that caught fire in Grenfell tower was also safe – which is incredible, considering it was responsible for 72 deaths. But see for yourself; here is what BEIS stated in the press release:
 
“The investigation into the fridge freezer Hotpoint FF175B model identified by the Metropolitan Police as being involved in the Grenfell Tower fire has confirmed there is no need for a product recall or any other corrective action, and that consumers can continue using the product as normal.

“As part of the government’s response to the Grenfell Tower fire, Business Secretary Greg Clark ordered an immediate examination of the unit by independent technical experts.”

​The second paragraph is misleading in other ways, too. First, the unit was not examined by independent technical experts. Similar second hand models were examined by an Intertek test laboratory which produced a (questionable) report that the experts then based their decision on. The actual unit in the Grenfell fire has not been examined by BEIS. Second, it probably goes without saying that the ‘independent experts’ were in fact either BEIS officials or other officials appointed by BEIS.
 
My view is that BEIS are trying to claim that the actual unit involved in the Grenfell fire is not dangerous because the last thing they want is attention being drawn to products they are responsible for having added to the fire. Like furniture.
 
I have been working with Lady Mar on trying to get flame retardants out of products. In July this year she raised some parliamentary questions for BEIS to answer. Here are two of them:
 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Fire Resistant Materials
HL9708
Q: To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they take to ensure that all flame retardants are safe (1) in normal use, (2) during fires, and (3) at the end of life when they are disposed of.
 
A: Manufacturers and distributors must ensure all consumer products are safe before they are placed on the UK market, including those that use flame retardants. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs have lead responsibility for environmental policy and restrictions on chemicals.
 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Fire Resistant Materials
HL9707
Q: To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the study by the University of Central Lancashire, Flame retardants in UK furniture increase smoke toxicity more than they reduce fire growth rate, published in April; whether they have consulted with their Chief Scientist in forming that assessment; and whether, following that study, they intend to reconsider the efficacy of current flame retardants.
 
A: The Department welcomes the paper by University of Central Lancashire and it forms part of the evidence we are considering in reviewing the legislation regulating the safety of furniture.
 
The first part of the first answer is not true. Flame retardants are not a product, for a start, and are therefore not governed by product safety laws. They are governed by REACH, the EU’s chemical assessment regime. While product safety law requires manufacturers to be able to demonstrate that, say, a bunk bed is safe beforeit’s placed on the market, using the recognised standards to do so, a flame retardant chemical can be placed on the market by the manufacturer purely on the grounds that he says it’s safe. The pattern with flame retardants is that eventually they are properly tested and almost always found to be toxic, then removed from the market. The problem being that they are still in millions of products. Note, too, that the second two points by Lady Mar were ignored. This is probably because where ‘during fires’ is concerned, FRs are incredibly toxic (see the UCLAN paper mentioned in the second question). And disposal of FRs at the end-life of products is a subject that both industry and BEIS are terrified of. In short, the Stockholm Convention is soon to rule that FRs in products must be disposed of safely thus. The UK, of course, possesses literally millions of sofas and mattresses stuffed full of toxic FRs. At present, these are disposed of dangerously but cheaply in land-fill. To dispose of them safely will cost a fortune. Strange that the Department for Business would choose not to mention this fact.
 
The second answer completely contradicts the first! The UCLAN paper proves that FR-treated UK furniture is highly toxic. You might also wonder what BEIS means by ‘considering’ the evidence that FRs are toxic in regard to regulating the Furniture Regs. Their own 2014 consultation paper demonstrates the toxicity of FRs. The UCLAN paper was published in December 2017 (although Professor Hull gave a demonstration of it several months earlier). Which means that for at least eight months, but more like for four years, this Department has done absolutely nothing about the fact that the failures in regulations it is responsible for are poisoning the entire country.
 
All of which raises perhaps the most germane question, why on earth are the consumer product safety laws in the UK governed by the Department for Business? 

From my journal, 4th June 2015
 
I feel as if I’m living in a parallel world to most other people. At the end of the European Branch team meeting today, Susannah [I’m now using these people’s real names, by the way], Our Leader, said that two teams had won the “Take the Biscuit” award this week. One was the “Fancy Dress” team, as she put it, and at first I thought it must be a bunch of people who’d put on a fancy dress evening recently (similar things have won). But then I realised she meant the team that had dealt with the recent “Watchdog” campaign, to extend the Nightwear Regs. 
 
[Claudia Winkleman’s daughter had been badly burned by a candle, her cheap and highly flammable fancy dress outfit going up in flames very easily. I was in charge of the Nightwear (Safety) Regulations, as well as the Furniture Regs. They are both UK-only regulations. The BBC and others were calling for stricter flammability requirements for fancy dress outfits. Certain flame retardant-loving types like Paul Fuller had been campaigning to have fancy dress outfits included in the Nightwear Regs, a move which could easily lead to lots of flame retardants in children’s clothing.]
 
I hadn’t made the connection because in reality it hasn’t been dealt with at all. Susannah went on to praise Phil [previously known in this blog as John Lord] and Richard because apparently, they’d . . . well, here’s the thing: I can’t remember what she said exactly – because it was false, or falsely reasoned. But in effect she was saying they’d got the Minister on board with our ‘solutions’. She mentioned me in passing then Richard, to applause, goes to get the prize; the biscuits. Parallel worlds, because I was thinking that the reality is this:
 

• Phil tried to exclude me from the process
• I found out anyway and produced a ton of stuff they didn’t know about
• I briefed Richard who’s supposed to be a standards expert but, well, isn’t, even if he knows a lot 
• a) it was actually me who did the important work, but b) they couldn’t even get that right in what they finally put to the Minister
• The result being that they haven’t come up with any solutions at all. They’ve bodged things, kidding themselves they’ve done good work when in fact whatever actually happens next is a lottery

 
Then we had a Furniture Regs project meeting. Parallel worlds again because I’m the Box 3 SEO who apparently can’t deal well with stakeholders but, once again, they have to keep asking me for advice and giving me the meaty action points, because despite their higher pay grades, they do not actually understand anything.
 
In short, they’re in a state of panic because they have no overview. They can’t handle me because I do. They can give me the lowest box marking for my annual report and generally treat me like crap but they can’t get round me because I know. Knowing comes from being always-on, coupled with commitment and insight.
 
By contrast, they’ve sold their integrity to an organisation that has long given up being actually effective. They spend their days managing – or trying to – everything down to their level of limited and fragmented understanding. Most of the time this works because they never get challenged by the real world outside. They can’t handle the Furniture Regs because they’re the UK’s responsibility and therefore represent the real world that’s sneaked inside these EU-dominated walls.
 
I send them emails or tell them in meetings that in effect a war’s coming and I watch the scared flickering shadows in their eyes, the “not me, surely?” thoughts. They try to fragment the issues so they can more easily deal with them. But the issue is not fragmented: it’s the fact that the government has failed the public. 
 
The two person team of me and Steve has been incredibly more effective than the numerically far superior groups we’ve been up against. We’ve faced hundreds of them across dozens of meetings and events and often been attacked and lied to and scorned. But they couldn’t beat us because we’re intact in our perceptions and moral underpinnings. The awareness matrix we’ve built between us has always been ahead of their games – not that it’s necessarily worked, of course.
 
FIFA built a shadow matrix, a network of connections and mutual deceptions which was rooted in greed. Which meant it was actually always using them, not the other way around. So, when the FBI comes calling, it all collapses instantly, with everyone at FIFA turning on each other. That can never happen with a positive matrix because it is formed around actualinsights. The shadow matrix is formed around weakness, self-deception, fantasy and greed. Crucially, the members of the shadow matrix aren’t actually in control of it. So, when it deserts them, they have nothing left to work from, to think from, to be from.
 
My lot are not exactly like FIFA but they have formed a shadow matrix. Phil is the main operator and puppeteer within it. But he’s still its creature. Chris has sold her soul to it when she should have trusted me – two of us would probably have been enough to make the difference. But here I’m missing the point: you can only join or form a positive matrix if you’re already a seeker after truth and integrity. You can perhaps be the supporter of a positive matrix, if you aren’t directly challenged by the needs of the shadow matrix opposing it; but that’s the subject of a whole different kind of process.
 
Richard Hull [professor of fire toxicity at UCLAN] recently made the point to me that BIS has probably never before had to deal with this kind of case, and he thought that was to my advantage. I wasn’t sure about that but I told him that I was no longer stressed; and that’s because I’m right and if that means they ultimately all get taken down, so be it.