Another thing many of the fire safety/flame retardants club members have in common is that they support children’s charities. This is how Mike Hagen opens his written submission to the Environmental Audit Committee:
 
“My name is Michael John Hagen. My CV is attached at the end of this submission. I served as a professional firefighter for over 33 years from 1978. Since leaving the Fire Service in late 2011, I have campaigned on Fire Safety on a part-time basis, mainly at a European level, until the end of 2018. Due mainly to the time pressures from my increasing (voluntary) involvement running a charity supporting education in Nepal, I recently reduced my fire safety work.”
 
And this is how he ends it:
 
“Meanwhile, it would never have crossed my mind as a young firefighter in Lancashire in 1978 that, one day, I would be named under parliamentary privilege simply for trying to save lives - I think I should be flattered!”
 
It was me who named him under parliamentary privilege – as someone who is supported by the flame retardant industry with large sums of money for what he claims is “independent” work in fire safety.
 
I find it interesting that he was the only witness who mentioned their charity work which, let’s face it, is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Unless that’s part of its function, to show that this is not the kind of person who would ever cause anyone harm, especially children. Another ex-firefighter also ran a children’s charity but suddenly shut it down when he retired from his full-time job at the time, which was promoting flame retardants. Another of them supports a children’s burns charity which is somewhat ironic since he is a firm supporter of flame retardants which he knows do nothing for the fire safety of our furniture, just get into children’s blood causing a multitude of health problems and, when they burn, shorten the time to incapacitation which means children in a furniture fire are more likely to suffer burns.
 
I believe it’s important to call out these hypocrites with psychopathic tendencies. Who know full well – because they were involved every step of the way – that we proved 5 years ago that the Furniture Regulations do not work. But instead of helping to put them right, they’ve chosen to lie to anyone who will listen that they do save lives. Why? Because they are being funded – both professionally and almost certainly personally – by the flame retardant industry.
 
If you go to my page, THE CASE AGAINST FLAME RETARDANTS, Part Two is the email I sent to Hagen on 23 October. I’m publishing it because I believe it’s a good example of how these people lie and profit from knowingly pushing fire safety measures they know do not work. It shows how, for example, the flame retardant industry controls puppets like Hagen to do their work, with in this case, the single tool of constantly expressing an opinion as fact until everyone believes them. Also, how they set up respectable-looking international fire safety conferences that inevitably attract decent people who don’t know better, whose presence is used in turn by the FR industry to further justify their products. Just like Scientology.
 
As of today, 27th October, Hagen has not replied [update: no reply by 13 January 2020; safe to assume therefore that there will not be one]. He may be wary of the extensive copy list I included. But it’s an open challenge: if he can prove me wrong, I’ll happily and publicly admit it and apologise to him. 
 
But both he and I know I’m right. Therefore, aside from more opinion-expressed-as-fact there isn’t anything he can say by way of reply. It’s most likely he’ll take the coward’s way out and not reply. This is common, in my experience. It’s utterly pathetic, of course, but at least it’s confirmation of sorts that you’ve called them out accurately for the dangerous liars that they are.

Groucho Marx famously once turned down the offer to join an exclusive gentlemens' club, informing that quite frankly, he wouldn't want to be a member of any club that would have him as a member. What makes this really funny is that he probably wasn't joking.
 
The fire safety world is full of clubs, associations and federations. None of them has ever asked me to join which is a shame since that means I can't do a Groucho on them. But it does at least tell me that I'm probably on the right track. 
 
I did manage to slip through the net towards the end of 2017 and get a speaking spot at the FIRE Congress, "Out of the flames: a fire safe future after the tragedy of Grenfell Tower". Many of the fire clubs were present: National Fire Chief's Council, Fire Sector Federation, Fire Protection Association, LFB, FBU and others. Although the event was intended to look at the lessons of Grenfell and plan a fire safe future for all, there weren't any Grenfell residents there, quite possibly because ticket prices started at just over £200 for the day. What was the main solution all these clubs came up with? You probably guessed it - to set up a new Council/Association/Academy (I forget precisely which), that would of course mean yet another club to join; new expenses to claim and dinners to attend. 
 
There is an unoffical club of clubs within the fire sector, and most of its members were present that day, for example Dave Sibert then of the FBU (before he got sacked for colluding with the flame retardant industry) and another great lover of flame retardants, Paul Fuller, who had to leave early because he had another charity dinner to attend. I'd been invited to dinner the night before by the congress organiser. Sibert and Fuller were there too (although they went through convolutions to make sure they weren't sitting next to me) but while they could wave their union paid for credit cards at the waiter, I had to pay for my own dinner. Staying Groucho clearly costs.
 
And so the same names crop up again and again in these fire clubs. Why is that a problem? Well, they do of course all know each other; go to the same conferences; stay at the same hotels; buy each other drinks, etc. Bottom line? Five years ago, the government proved that the Furniture Regulations are not fit for purpose; that they aren't fire-safe. Yet not one of these club members has done a single thing about that, even though they're meant to be dedicated to fire safety. Not a single one of them has ever denied it's true, either.
 

​Matthew Hancock, the Health Secretary, has been in the news recently, telling everyone that there's a "very strong argument" for making vaccinating children compulsory. He said:
"The worst thing is if you don't vaccinate your child and you can, then the person you are putting at risk is not only just your own child, but it's also the child that can't be vaccinated for medical reasons. Maybe they have cancer and their immune system is too weak. I don't want the debate to put people off because there is absolute clarity on what the science says and what the right thing is to do."
 
All of which sounds reasonable(ish). However, this is the same Matthew Hancock who went out of his way to team up with Oliver Letwin in December 2014 and pressure Jo Swinson into delaying safety changes to the Furniture Regulations. At that time, Swinson was the Minister for the Regulations; Hancock was Minister for State for Business and Enterprise, and Letwin was Minister for Policy at the Cabinet Office. As I've detailed elsewhere on this site, Letwin made contact with me several times regarding the failing Furniture Regulations. He professed a desire to ensure that the changes we'd proposed went ahead, thereby making furniture less chemically toxic and fire-safe. He even had a half hour phone call with me at one point in which he promised to encourage the Permanent Secretary at BIS to get the changes in asap. I don't know if he ever contacted the Perm Sec but I do know that soon after this he ganged up with Hancock to ensure that the very opposite happened, i.e. that the Regs remained unchanged.
 
Swinson had been conflicted. She'd expressed to her civil servants a strong desire to put safety first where the Regulations were concerned. But my managers kept telling her that more work needed to be done first (it didn't). I suspect she was also getting similar views from coalition Tory ministers too. At one point, she asked me to write a paper explaining exactly why the current match test in the Regulations fails and why the new one would succeed. I wrote it and got feed-back that she was really pleased with it; that it explained everything clearly and convincingly. She asked me to answer some further questions, which I did but never heard back from her. Very shortly afterwards, she had that meeting with Letwin and Hancock in which she agreed with them to delay bringing in the changes. (She does of course know that the changes are still being blocked and I wonder if she's made sure that any mattress her new child sleeps on does not contain flame retardants, to hell with the expense; if so, then all that work we did to get rid of them, and which she signed off, will at least have benefited her family, if hardly anyone else's.)
 
What Hancock says about vaccinations - that "there is absolute clarity on what the science says and what the right thing to do is" – is true of the Furniture Regulations. The science has proved they don't work and the right thing to do is to change them so that they do. Yet while Hancock wants to pursue the science where vaccinations are concerned, he has gone in the opposite direction with the Furniture Regulations.
 
I wonder why? What common denominators might be at play? Well, the obvious one is money. Vaccinations make billions for Big Pharma; compulsory vaccinating will make them even more. The current unchanged Furniture Regulations make Big Chem many millions too. Another common denominator is that in both scenarios UK children get pumped full of chemicals. Where one lot is concerned, Hancock believes they'll do children a lot of good. He hasn't said what he believes all those flame retardants in children's blood will do, even those still in our sofas and mattresses that have since been banned because they're so toxic.
 
By the way, Letwin showed his true colours after this incident. As Chair of the Red Tape Initiative, which also includes Greg Clarke, Secretary of State for the Department for Business, he attended a meeting on the very day Grenfell Tower was burning, the objective of which was to identify building rules that could be cut:  https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/05/grenfell-fire-public-inquiry-stitch-up-red-tape-regulation-policy-exchange
 
This was unfortunate timing, of course. It was also contradictory to his past actions. Back in 2012/13, he'd taken a lead role in the government's Red Tape Challenge and wanted to cut the Furniture Regulations as a de-regulatory measure. He changed his mind at the last minute but never said why. For a while, I thought it was simply a desire to keep the public safe, since at that time we still believed the Regulations worked, even if it went against his de-regulation agenda. Silly me. Cutting the Furniture Regulations would have cost industry billions. So, even when we'd proved to Swinson, Hancock and Letwin that the Regulations were not providing fire safety, they still opted to protect industry profits.
 
I do not know how effective vaccinations are but I do know you cannot trust anything that Matthew Hancock says. Or Oliver Letwin; or James Brokenshire; or Sajid Javid; or Kit Malthouse, since they have all in different ways made sure that the Furniture Regulations remain unfit for purpose and in the process continue making a fortune for industry and its supporters.
 

 
 

From my journal, June 5th 2019
 
Attended the last oral session today at the EAC [Environmental Audit Committee]. The BEIS Minister, Kelly Tolhurst, with three other government reps, faced some very tough questioning. Mary Creagh's first question of the day to Tolhurst was: "If I can ask you first of all, Minister Tolhurst – about the fact that five years ago BEIS proved that the current match test is not fit for purpose. Do you agree with that? If you do not, why do you not agree with it?"
 
This of course is probably the key question to everything concerning the Furniture Regs, and great that Mary Creagh got straight to the point. Would we now get a definitive yes or no answer from the Minister on a subject that is crucial to the safety of the entire country? Would we hell.
 
Tolhurst first thanked the Committee for the opportunity to talk about this subject. Well, she didn't really have much choice, did she? She might have explained why her officials have been incredibly reluctant to talk about the same subject over the past 3 or 4 years but given those same officials had written her words I suppose it wasn't very likely. She went on for quite some time, giving a potted history of the review of the Furniture Regs – sorry, "review". Told one outright porky – that there was not a big enough evidence base for changing the test, when the uncontested evidence for doing exactly that is on her own department's website. 
 
The Chair interrupted Tolhurst's stream of unconsciousness to point out that the review she was talking about has been going on for ten years with no result in sight. To cut a long story short, Tolhurst's dodges took the form of waffle about how the review is looking at everything (it isn't); that she wasn't  around then (so what?); it's all so complex (no, it isn't -the EAC has picked up the issues and details pretty swiftly), and the oft-repeated assertion that she must "make sure there is no reduction in fire safety". The latter I suppose could be accurate in that there is no fire safety presently provided by the Furniture Regs, therefore it isn't actually possible to reduce it any further.
 
The EAC tried every variation of the main question, about the fact the Regs in effect don't work – e.g. Caroline Lucas pointing out that no one else has a match test so why do we? – but the answer was always the same, "We're reviewing . . . "
 
A big alarm bell for me was when Tolhurst talked about the British Standards Institute. She started with a lie – or read out the lie that was given to her by her officials – that in 2015 further work was facilitated by BEIS from BSI on the match test. It wasn't. BSI turned it down because it was regulatory work and too political for them to be involved in. Then she went on to say that they are going to get BSI to come up with a range of new requirements. If anything proved that government is aiding the desires of industry above public safety, this was it. Because K Kannah of Lanxess had previously insisted to the EAC that this was the proper route for BEIS to take in updating the Regulations. Well, he would, wouldn't he, given that the BSI committee concerned comprises almost entirely industry reps, most of who are making a packet one way or another out of flame retardants in furniture.
 
Professor Tim Gant of Public Health England did a great job, just a pity it wasn't for the people he's supposed to be representing. If you read his responses to the EAC without knowing where he was from you'd conclude he must be from industry. According to Gant, the Grenfell fire wasn't toxic, the Grenfell Cough doesn't exist (which means all those folk coughing up their lungs at the Grenfell meetings I've attended must be suffering from False Cough Syndrome), and soil around Grenfell is no more toxic than anywhere else in London. 
 
He did make one interesting comment, however, which was this: "We know that the plume [of smoke and fumes from burning cladding] rose up and went a long way out, so it was not deposited in the immediate area."
 
Hmmmm. Could this be an example of how those with something to hide sometimes contradict others with something to hide? Because many of course claim that cladding was the main supplier of toxic fumes which killed people in the fire. I mean, basic physics says Gant is right: hot air moving fast on the outside of the Tower would have stayed outside for the most part. But it's clear he's stating this now only to "explain" why the soil around Grenfell Tower was not toxic. Except of course it was. Because what he isn't referring to is the vast volume of flame retarded furniture which burned inside the Tower. How did that get carried "a long way out" professor?
 
The fact is that all four of them – from Defra, BEIS, PHE and HSE – never once stated anything with positivity and clarity. Worse, what they didn't do, not once, was give public safety the benefit of the doubt, only industry. One example was Gant stating that the levels of organophosphate chemicals in mattresses are "low" and therefore not a risk. But the thing is, he can have no way of knowing. We happen to know that they are in fact high – but only via internal intelligence that's not in the public domain. So why would he err in industry's favour? 
 
Most telling was something the Countess of Mar said to me at the end. We were sitting behind the two rows of civil servants who'd briefed their masters and every now and then had been slipping them notes. "They look really pleased with themselves," said the Countess, "because they think they've got away with it."

From my journal, 3rd July 2015
 
This morning I got a call from a director at XXX, a big retailer that was hit hard (and unfairly) by the "Fake Britain" programme last year, orchestrated of course by the Skipton Mafia (FIRA, Clarkson Textiles, etc). He talked about not wanting to follow FIRA any more, instead to take a lead in improving safety and traceability. He said that FIRA has been telling everyone that the new match test is Steve Owen's "pet project" but he thinks that's probably because they didn't think of it. Which is exactly what H of DFS said to me too. We had a good talk and he's going to come to the stakeholder day. He said it was refreshing to talk to someone who understands the industry, chemicals, etc. Which is another great piece of stakeholder management on my part of course but another that Bridget and Phil will make sure doesn't appear on my annual report.
 
I had a long talk with Steve in which we reflected that these people (B & P, Chris, Susannah) don't know how to think. Steve said they listen to our words but they don't hear what we're saying, only what they want to hear. He gave the example of the recent phone call he'd had with Bridget (who was trying to get him to agree to support her requirements at the upcoming FW6 meeting). [Note: FW6 is the British Standards Institute's working group on furniture flammability, that Steve was and is the Chair of.] He told her that he would be impartial, as he needed to be as Chair, but she just didn't hear him. I said that's because she lacks integrity and the ability to be impartial and therefore doesn't recognise it in anyone else. Because she's a senior civil servant she thinks that automatically provides her with those qualities but anyone with actual integrity will easily spot her as manipulative and reacting badly if she doesn't get her own way. 
 
There was another example of this in Phil's internal note yesterday, telling us about his recent trip to BSI, and including the email he'd had back from them afterwards. [Background: Bridget and Phil manipulated the Department's official response to the 2014 consultation, aiding industry in blocking/delaying changes to the Regulations by getting the Minister to agree that more work would be undertaken by BSI. The slight problem they faced was that no more work was actually needed. Nevertheless, they'd badgered BSI management into agreeing to hold a meeting of FW6 at which, they hoped, more work would be agreed upon. Phil's meeting that I'm describing here was to in effect seal the deal. I was of course the Department's expert on the Furniture Regulations but I don't think anyone reading this will have too much trouble in guessing why Mr Earl didn't invite me along to the meeting.] According to Phil it was a "success"; then again, I have this nasty habit of looking a bit closer at the details . . . 
 
First, he tries to imply that BSI management will tell FW6 about our August deadline but looking at BSI's email that clearly hasn't been promised [and indeed never came about]. Second, he records their conversation as if everything he wants has been agreed to but it hasn't; it's been "acknowledged", to use BSI's word – one that Phil should spot as the kind he often uses to the very same end. Thirdly and crucially is what isn't mentioned:

• Why the f*ck did BSI management remove the August deadline from the papers they sent to FW6 about the upcoming meeting? (A much clearer sign, surely, that they don't intend to meet it.)

• Why the f*ck didn't Phil ask Steve what he thinks? He is after all the Chair of FW6. Well, I think we know why: Steve would have told him where to go if he'd suggested in any way that Steve might like to compromise his impartiality, and would have made sure that unlike with Bridget, Mr Earl definitely heard him.

 
Overall, then, it's the usual half-witted half-fix, intended to preserve their backsides for a few more months when they hope something, anything, maybe the civil service Sir Humphrey shaped fairy, will save their bacon. 
 
Finally, the main thing Phil has failed to mention is why he doesn't want to personally attend the FW6 meeting despite his great "success" in setting it up to suit his – sorry, the Department's – needs.
 
Because the one big truth which they are all studiously avoiding is that it is Terry who will have to stand in front of FW6 and guests and single-handedly deal with all their technical questions and all the sneaky tricks from FIRA and FRETWORK and Sir Ken Knight for a couple of hours or so. Phil and Bridget will be safely hunkered down in our headquarters and while Chris [Knox, my line manager] has been told to attend, there is no way she will actually face the music [in the event she failed to turn up until lunch time when all the hard questioning was over; something about a "family matter"]. She has agreed however to draft the lines-to-take that I'm supposed to use at the meeting. Which should be very interesting since a truthful line would be something like: "Terry's management f*cked up, are misleading ministers and now doing anything they can to cover their backs. Oh, and at least one of them is probably on the make."
 
Just to make it more interesting for her, I've told her that I am not going to say anything that isn't true. Wish I'd taken a picture of her face: first, white with fear, quickly turning red with mock anger at my insubordination.
 
Also today, I received an email from the PA for Martin Donnelly [Permanent Secretary to the Department; head honcho civil servant. I'd written to him requesting that he do something about the fact my managers were putting the entire country at risk and in such a way that could greatly embarrass the Department.] Apparently, he can't intervene because that might prejudice my Civil Service Code case. That's very considerate of him but I wrote back requesting a meeting with him and pointing out that no one, including him, has done anything about my point that the Department's process in handling my case is prejudicing it for real, i.e. because Susannah Simon has been allowed to appoint the case officer even though Susannah is Bridget's manager, one of the people my case is against, and who clearly could be implicated in any findings against Bridget, and of course Bridget is Phil's manager. I'm not holding my breath that Donnelly will do anything mind you [he didn't].

 
Today, BEIS finally issued its official response to the 2016 consultation. You can access it here. Their public statement about it is here. As for the statement, I don't think I've ever seen as big a pack of lies issuing from a government department. Literally, every single sentence is untrue.
 
As for the response itself, the first thing to consider is that it was forced on BEIS by the EAC's damning report. The 2016 consultation itself was forced on BEIS by press intervention regarding my whistle-blowing case that highlighted the fact BEIS was, once again, sitting on safety changes for no good reason.
 
Bottom line of the response? BEIS is not going to implement any of the proposals in the consultation. Instead it is going to take a different course of action that was not in the proposals at all. I'm not sure this is even legal; at the very least it's caused hundreds of stakeholders five years worth of work, waiting, being consulted, responding, having to chase BEIS endlessly via letters, forced meetings, etc – and all to be told at the last minute that none of it counted anyway.
 
In short, BEIS is dismantling the Regulations and handing over responsibility to manufacturers, combined with getting British Standards to come up with new standards. Which is rather confusing since the response also states that it is doing away with testing standards. To make new ones.
 
BEIS claims it has been working with British Standards (BSI) on this. But one of my sources there tells me there has been no communication at all with the BSI committee that deals with furniture fire safety standards. BEIS also seems to be totally unaware that it tried the same thing in 2015 – to get BSI to take over responsibility but BSI eventually refused, quite sensibly on the grounds that it did not want to get involved with regulations, especially ones that are so politically sensitive. BEIS may not know this because, believe it or not, it has no files or records from that period. They could of course have found out simply by reading this website, but then their main response in that respect has been to ban BEIS officials from looking at it at all.
 
Bottom line, consequences wise? Even if BSI agrees to take on this work, a normal, non-contentious standard takes about three years to produce. This however is very contentious so we are looking at 5/6 years before anything emerges. In the meantime, says BEIS, the current regulations will stay in place.
 
Which means at least another 500,000 tons of toxic flame retardants will get into UK homes and make fires hugely more toxic, thereby continuing to give firefighters above-normal levels of cancer – this from a Department that is apparently committed to reducing flame retardants in furniture.
 
As I've said before on this site, the fact is that the 2016 consultation was unimplementable. And here I'm going to name the two civil servants who are chiefly responsible for in effect consigning us all to at least 10 years of toxic poisoning in our own homes: Bridget Micklem and Phil Earl. These two went against Ministers' orders to implement the new match test in April 2016. BEIS lawyers advised that this could be done without another consultation. Micklem and Earl, without any input or agreement from Ministers, concocted the 2016 consultation and ensured it could never be implemented by the fact it was incomplete and contained contentious proposals that also had not been cleared by a Minister.
 
These two are the main culprits for hundreds, perhaps thousands, of UK children contracting cancers and other diseases. They are chiefly responsible for ensuring that firefighters will continue to battle the most toxic house fires in the world. These are the two who have no conscience and answer only to their egos. Not to mention the flame retardant industry's long history of buying up key officials.
 
Gareth Simkins described the Furniture Regulations to Mary Creagh, Chair of the EAC, when she first asked us about them as "The biggest-ever scandal in UK product history." I think he's right. And the scandal continues.
 
The head of the Office of Product Safety Standards – the part of BEIS now responsible for these regulations – Graham Russell, said this in a recent interview:
 
“What motivates me is that this is about protecting people – particularly the most vulnerable people. I think that’s what drives a lot of people in this area.”
 
Given his response today, this must rank as one of the most hypocritical, sociopathic and downright dishonest statements ever made by a public official. 
 
He is of course, like Micklem and Earl, a public servant who is supposed to serve us, the public. As I recorded in an earlier blog, this is the man who, when I tried to talk to him about these regulations recently, shouted, "I'm not talking to you!" then barged me out of the way as he ran from the room.

Listen to Mary Greagh, Chair of the EAC, introducing the report here. 
 
The report itself is here.
 
There have been numerous press articles about the report but a very good one by Gareth Simkins of the ENDS Report is here.
 
Front page of the Daily Mail today below. Article here.

 
Yesterday, I was invited to attend a meeting in the House of Lords of the All Party Parliamentary Fire Safety and Rescue Group. Jon O'Neill of the Fire Protection Association gave a short talk on third party certification. He also talked about the need to update the Fire Safety Order, particularly in light of the Grenfell Tower fire. He and the FPA have talked a lot about the FSO recently but strangely have never mentioned the Furniture Regulations. This, despite O'Neill, along with Sir Ken Knight and Dave Sibert, having given a presentation to the Department of Business in December 2014 where they agreed that the current match test does not work and the new one will improve fire safety.
 
At the end of the meeting yesterday, I approached Mr O'Neill and asked him: "Where is the new test foam formula you insisted BEIS needed before putting the new match test in place?" There was quite a long pause then he said: "We passed it to British Standards."
 
Below is an entry from a paper I've written detailing the way that various parties blocked safety changes to the changes proposed by the government to the Furniture Regulations in 2014. It's based on BIS's meeting note and on the FPA's own presentation slideshow. I've mentioned before that Jon O'Neill was particularly aggressive over these changes, initially commanding my colleagues at the Department for Communities and Local Government to stop them. DCLG was not of course the department in charge of the Furniture Regs but then Mr O'Neill knew that. He also knew that Sir Ken Knight was the big fire chief at DCLG and had considerable influence over the officials working there on fire safety. In the event, two meetings were held in order for O'Neill, Sir Ken and others to try to bully BIS into dropping the changes. Unfortunately for them, the evidence that we had provided was unequivocal: the current test did not work and the new one would. 
 
Finally, O'Neill etc talked my BIS managers into a third meeting at which they said they would provide a new test foam formula for the new test – even though this was not needed since we already had one (that is actually in the current regulations). They did not come with the formula, however; instead they presented a delaying tactic (see below), i.e. that British Standards should be commissioned by BIS to spend 12 months coming up with a new test foam formula. As you can see from Mr O'Neill's follow up email to Bridget Micklem at BIS, he assumed that she had agreed they could go ahead. She did not reply to this email; however, the same suggestions were put to the minister, Jo Swinson, a few months later by amongst others, Dave Sibert and Paul Fuller (well-know lovers of flame retardants). She agreed. However, British Standards bailed at the last moment (in July 2015), informing the Chair of their relevant committee that they did not want to get involved in regulatory work especially when it was so politically sensitive. Since that time, changes to the Regulations remain blocked. BEIS did however go out to consultation once again in 2016 with exactly the same new match test proposal containing exactly the same test foam formula as proposed in 2014. In short, Mr O'Neill, Sir Ken Knight, etc, had done nothing more than hold up important safety changes for two years, and counting.
 
As I've recorded elsewhere on this website, I wrote to Sir Ken Knight twice in his capacity as Chair of the Grenfell Independent Experts Group, reminding him of the December 2014 meeting where he'd agreed that the current match test doesn't work and therefore to look at the role the failed Furniture Regulations played in the Grenfell fire. He didn't respond; neither has his panel ever even mentioned the Furniture Regulations. I also wrote to Jon O'Neill on the same lines who also did not reply.
 
Back to yesterday . . . I reminded Mr O'Neill that British Standards had refused that work, then asked him why the Fire Protection Association has done nothing about the fact the current match test fails in practice ever since (more than four years and counting), i.e. they're failing to protect the public from fire risk. To which he said, "We didn't agree the current match test fails." See below and make up your own mind about that.
 
But here's the thing: even if what he said was true, i.e. that in effect he believes the current match test works, why did he insist on a different test foam for the new test. Why not simply state that we should stick with the current one? Well, he was lying anyway. Just check out the third bullet point on his slide below: that the new test "should improve fire safety through the inclusion of materials which appear within 40mm of the cover fabric of a furniture product." Now I don't think I'm putting unfair interpretation on this but surely this is saying that because the current test doesn't allow for this effect, finished sofas are clearly not fire-safe? Also, a man apparently dedicated to fire safety has never since mentioned this failing of the current regulations.
 
At this point, Mr O'Neill was ushered away by a colleague, arm around his shoulder, to protect him from further questioning. Really, I'm not kidding. 
 
I've shown the links before between the FPA and the FR industry. One such being that after Dave Sibert was sacked by the FBU for colluding with the flame retardant industry (Matt Wrack's words), he was offered a lucrative new job by Jon O'Neill running the FPA's new test laboratory.
 
Does the FPA really care about fire safety? Well, I think that depends on who's paying them.
 
Oh, by the way, that colleague of Mr O'Neill's said that I should not be making these these claims (such as they were) without proof. If he's reading this blog, I suggest he checks out the entry below.
 
* * * 
 
Third meeting with the FPA/FSF – December 16, 2014
 
Sir Ken Knight, Jon O'Neill and Dave Sibert attend for the FPA/FSF (Fire Sector Federation). They start by giving a presentation, the essence of which is that they agree the new match test will work and that the current one has many problems. But they do not as agreed provide a new test foam formula. Instead, they insist that BIS commissions the British Standards Institute to 'fast-track' (over 12 months) a new formula for the regulations, in the meantime suggesting that BIS should go ahead with an interim test. 
 
See key slide in the FPA/FSF's presentation at bottom of this entry.
 
The important bottom line here is that the FPA/FSF is agreeing with BIS's proposed test, even if they're falsely claiming these are all FSF proposals! The only addition they're making is that BIS should initially go ahead with the new match test but continue using the old test foam, while British Standards comes up with a new one. However, this is blatant back-covering since they know very well that BIS cannot simply introduce a new interim test: that would require another consultation and would in any case be an unfair burden on industry. On the last slide point: they have of course ensured that this issue has continued to drag on ever since. 
 
It’s perhaps worth mentioning here that there is no evidence at all that the British Standards Institute had agreed to these proposals. In fact, their actions over the meeting they hosted on July 15th suggests they did not. For example, they instruct the Chair at the last moment, that they want this whole subject off their agenda since it is too political for them and in any case they do not believe they should be involved in drafting legislation.
 
Immediately after the meeting, O'Neill writes to Bridget Micklem of BIS to thank her for the meeting and ask her views on their proposals (see email below). She doesn't respond, despite Terry advising that this proposal from the FPA is pivotal, i.e. it is a Yes or No situation: if BIS says Yes, then a) the new match test will surely be delayed for at least a year, and b) BIS will have accepted FSF/FPA/Sir Ken Knight as being the main authority on the FFRs, and that will mean they’ll be able to extend the delays indefinitely. Not responding is likely to be taken as Yes, as indeed proves to be the case when the FPA/FSF gets their proposal confirmed at the Minister's round-table meeting in February 2015.
 
 
From: Jon O'Neill 
Sent: 16 December 2014 14:43
To: Micklem Bridget (EU); Earl Philip (EUD); Mike Larking; Louise Upton; Ken Knight; Dave Sibert; Edge Terry (EUD)
Subject: Furniture Regulations.pptx
 
Bridget
 
Thanks for your time today. As promised please find enclosed copy of my presentation. Having got the support of individual insurers to the proposal I am speaking to the ABI tomorrow and will pass on ant comments that arise.
 
I look forward to receiving your feedback to our proposal in due course.
 
Thanks & regards
 
Jon
 
 

Over the past 30 years, at a rough estimate, if you live in a house or flat you are almost twice as likely to die in a fire as someone who lives in a tower block covered in combustible cladding. In addition, the fire will be more toxic than a cladding fire and will affect you more negatively.
 
On top of that, you will also be risking your health from the large volumes of flame retardant dust that wear off your furniture on a daily basis and get into you; something that is not a problem with cladding.
 
So, when people living in tower blocks covered in cladding say they cannot sleep soundly in their beds, it's actually their bed they should probably be more worried about. For a start, they've been told it's not flammable because it must comply with the UK's tough furniture fire safety laws. But as this website has revealed, those laws do not work. For a start, they do not take account of the fact that no one sleeps on a bare mattress upon which they may drop a lighted match (the basis of the ignition test that applies). Bedding catches fire first and the amount of flame it produces completely wipes out any resistance the match test provides (even if it worked) by the time it reaches the mattress.
 
Why then is there so much talk about removing cladding from buildings but none about removing furniture from people's homes? 
 
Let's look at some fire statistics. In the year 2017/18 there were 334 fire deaths in England. Around 80% of these occurred in dwellings, making 267 deaths. This represented an increase of 71 on the previous year, which is roughly the same as the official Grenfell Tower death toll. In the same year there were just over 30,000 primary fires in homes in England. A 'primary' fire is one that involves fatalities, casualties, rescues or five or more pumps in attendance. While most of these did not result in deaths, the statistics do not record the damage done to health and the environment by the massive volumes of toxins produced in all those fires. 
 
It seems, perhaps understandably, that a concentration of deaths in one place increases people's perception of risk. But there were nearly 200 fire deaths last year in dwellings other than Grenfell Tower. Yet they were spread out over the country, as were the deaths, and therefore received little if any attention other than local. But each death would have been totally devastating for the family concerned, and they would have been homeless too, everything lost in the fire.
 
And if you are concerned about firefighters' health, then clearly many more are affected by toxic fumes and smoke on a daily basis by house fires in general than were at the Grenfell Tower fire. While it is completely proper and understandable that the Grenfell fire should go through an official inquiry, where is the inquiry into the 200 deaths in fires in UK homes that same year? 
 
In short, in my view, a major reason why so much attention remains on cladding and so little on toxic fumes from furniture and other products inside the Tower is that it suits government and business to keep the argument narrow rather than expand into all the associated, at least equally and in some cases more important issues. At the very least, there are costs comparisons that make the argument obvious. The cost of replacing all combustible cladding on tower blocks is clearly dwarfed by the cost of replacing virtually every sofa and mattress in 27 million homes, not to mention disposing of them safely too. 
 
The obvious tactic, therefore, is to spend years debating about who's responsible for cladding replacement while in the meantime ignore the greater threat and, in the tried and tested British way, even if you end up paying for the one (and that is of course still open to debate -  long, long debate), you will at least avoid paying anything at all towards the much bigger problem.
 
Another cost argument is that at present, the flame retardant industry does not make much money from cladding. However, its paid for puppets, like the Fire Protection Association, BRE, Sir Ken Knight, Dave Sibert, etc, are working hard to increases the market via 'non-combustible cladding' (they never argue for simply removing it altogether). So it'll either lose a bit or gain a lot from cladding. Meanwhile, it's working hard to keep attention off of upholstered furniture because if that massive fire and poison risk is sorted out, the chemical industry could lose around £300m a year, and the UK furniture industry its much-loved trade barrier. Not to mention the massive hand-outs enjoyed by the puppets.